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Abstract. This paper develops the category NCG. Its objects are node-
and-choice games, which include essentially all extensive-form games. Its
morphisms allow arbitrary transformations of a game’s nodes, choices, and
players, as well as monotonic transformations of the utility functions of the
game’s players. Among the morphisms are subgame inclusions. Several char-
acterizations and numerous properties of the isomorphisms are derived. Also,
the game-theoretic concepts of no-absentmindedness, perfect-information, and
(pure-strategy) Nash-equilibrium are shown to be isomorphically invariant. Fi-
nally, full subcategories are defined for choice-sequence games and choice-set
games, and relationships among these two subcategories and NCG itself are
expressed and derived via isomorphic inclusions and equivalences.
1. Introduction
1.1. A foundational question
Extensive-form games can be specified in many different styles, and some of
these styles are reviewed in Section 1.2 below. It is informally understood that any
fundamental concept in one style should have the same meaning in any other style,
and that any fundamental result in one style should also hold in any another style.
This informal understanding might be formally developed. In particular, when
a fundamental concept or result is translated from one style to another, how would
we define the sense in which the translation itself was correct or incorrect? A
good answer to this broad question promises to let us more efficiently identify and
manipulate fundamental game-theoretic concepts and results.
This paper is part of a larger agenda to answer this and related questions. Fur-
ther discussion appears in Section 1.3 below.
1.2. Specification styles
Figure 1.1 depicts two games, both resembling Selten 1975, Figure 1. The two
games have the same underlying “form”, that is, the same configuration of nodes,
choices, and information sets, and the same assignment of information sets to play-
ers. Briefly, in both games, nodes are numbers, choices are letters, the information
set {0} is assigned to player P1 , the information set {1} is assigned to player P2 ,
and the information set {3, 4} is assigned to player P3 .
At the same time, the two games differ in how they assign utilities. For example,
consider the the play {0, 3, 5}, that is, the play through nodes 0, 3, and 5. In
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Figure 1.1. (a) is a node-and-choice game (later called an “NCG
game”). (b) is another. In both games, player P3 selects choice e or
choice f without knowing whether she is at node 3 or node 4. In the
context of this paper, the games’ utilities have the same meaning.1
game (a), player P1 gets utility 1 from this play (shown as the first entry in the
vector beneath node 5). Meanwhile in game (b), player P1 gets utility 3 from
this play. Nonetheless, in the context of this paper, the utilities in the two games
have the same meaning in the sense that they have the same ordinal content.1 For
example, in both games, player P1 most desires play {0, 3, 5}, least desires play
{0, 1, 4, 8}, and regards the remaining three plays as equally desirable.2
In addition to the different ways of assigning utilities, there are many styles in
which to specify the underlying form of a game.3 All form styles must specify [a]
nodes, which are variously called “histories”, “vertices”, or “states”, and [b] choices,
which are variously called “actions”, “alternatives”, “labels”, or “programs”. The
following paragraphs arrange these form styles into five broad groups according to
how the form styles specify nodes and choices. Representatives of these five groups
are arranged in a spectrum by Streufert 2019, Figure 2, and that paper’s Section 7
explains how each has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Group 1. Some form styles specify nodes and choices abstractly without restric-
tion. Classic examples from economics include the style of Kuhn 1953 and the style
of Selten 1975. Examples from computer science and/or logic include the “labeled
1The utilities in the two games would not have the same meaning if mixed strategies were
allowed and the specified utilities were used to construct expected utilities. Expected utilities
attach more meaning to the specified utilities, and this additional meaning can be embodied by
an NCG subcategory that admits only affine utility transformations. The construction of this
subcategory is left for future research.
2To tell a story matching these two games, suppose a student (called P1 ) must decide between
the acceptable choice of doing her homework (called a) and the bad choice of not doing her
homework (called b). Knowing that the homework has been finished (node 1), a goat (P2 ) must
decide between the good choice of taking a nap (g) and the dumb choice of eating the homework
(d). Finally, without knowing whether the student played bad (node 3) or the student played
acceptable and the goat played dumb (node 4), the teacher (P3 ) must choose between excusing
the student (e) and failing the student (f). The student most prefers being excused without doing
the homework (play {0, 3, 5}), and least prefers failing after doing the homework (play {0, 1, 4, 8}).
The goat likes eating homework (going through node 4). The teacher does not want to excuse a
badly behaving student (play {0, 3, 5}) or to fail an acceptably behaving student (play {0, 1, 4, 8}).
3The next four paragraphs draw heavily from Streufert 2020 Section 1.2.
1. Introduction 3
(a)
0
a
1
g
(a, g){}
b
3
(a)
d
4
e
(b, e)
(b)
f
(b, f)
(a, d)
f
(a, d, f)
e
(a, d, e)
P1 P2
P3
00
1

10
0
 00
1
 01
1
 -11
0

(b)
0
a
1
g {a, g}{}
b
3
{a}
d
4
e
{b, e}
{b}
f
{b, f}
{a, d}
f
{a, d, f}
e
{a, d, e}
P1 P2
P3
00
1

10
0
 00
1
 01
1
 -11
0

Figure 1.2. (a) A choice-sequence game (later called a “CsqG
game”). (b) A choice-set game (later called a “CsetG game”). This
paper develops subcategories for these special kinds of node-and-choice
games.
transition system” style in Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema 2001, page 3 (and
elsewhere); the style of Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009, page 125; and the “epis-
temic process graph” style of van Benthem 2014, page 70.4 A final example is the
“node-and-choice” style of this paper (which has already appeared in Figure 1.1).
Because each of these form styles specifies nodes and choices abstractly without
restriction, each can be understood to encompass essentially all other form styles
as special cases.5
Group 2. Other form styles specify nodes as sequences of choices. Examples
from economics include the style of Harris 1985 and the style of Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994, page 200. Examples from logic include the “logical game” style
of Hodges 2013, Section 2, and the “epistemic forest model” style of van Benthem
2014, page 130. Examples from computer science include the “protocol” style of
Parikh and Ramanujam 1985, the “history-based multi-agent structure” style of
Pacuit 2007, and the “sequence-form representation” style of Shoham and Leyton-
Brown 2009, page 129. A final example is the “choice-sequence” style of this paper
(see Figure 1.2(a)).
4Some labeled transition systems and process graphs have recursive transitions. These do
not support extensive-form games because extensive-form games require trees. (Similarly, all
stochastic games (Mertens 2002) have recursive transitions, and these too are not extensive-form
games.)
5Accordingly, this paper’s node-and-choice games include essentially all extensive-form games.
Several aspects of this claim should be clarified. [a] A node-and-choice game is discrete in the
sense that each node has a finite number of predecessors. This assumption excludes non-discrete
extensive-form games such as those of Dockner, Jørgensen, Long, and Sorger 2000, and Alo´s-
Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016. [b] A node-and-choice game assumes that information sets do not
share alternatives. This assumption is insubstantial in the sense of Streufert 2020, note 19. [c] A
node-and-choice game assumes that exactly one player moves at each information set. Accordingly,
simultaneous moves by several players are specified by several information sets, as in Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994, page 202. [d] A node-and-choice game specifies payoffs by utility functions.
Alternatively, payoffs could be specified by preference relations. A corresponding category is left
for future research.
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Figure 1.3. In (a), choices are node sets. In (b), both nodes and
choices are outcome sets. This paper does not develop subcategories for
these special kinds of node-and-choice games.
Group 3. Some new form styles specify nodes as sets of choices. These are the
“choice-set” style of Streufert 2019, and the closely related “choice-set” style of this
paper (see Figure 1.2(b)).
Finally, two more groups remain. While subcategories corresponding to groups
2 and 3 are developed in this paper, subcategories corresponding to groups 4 and 5
are left for future research (see note 6). Group 4. Some form styles specify choices as
sets of nodes, as in the “simple” style of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.3
(see Figure 1.3(a)). Group 5. Other form styles express both nodes and choices as
sets of outcomes, as in the style of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Section 10,
and the style of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.2 (see Figure 1.3(b)).
1.3. Summary and Motivation
This section discusses five topics, and lastly, related literature. The paper’s main
contributions within each topic are summarized and motivated.
Translating Games. Intuitively, the six games in Section 1.2 should be equivalent.
Formally, Section 3 develops an appealing category in which these six games are
isomorphic. The category is called “NCG”, for the “category of node-and-choice
games”. Each of its objects is a game consisting of [A] a form that specifies nodes,
choices, and players, and [B] a utility function for each player that assigns a utility
number to each of the form’s plays. Each of the category’s morphisms consists of [A]
a form morphism that transforms nodes, choices, and players, and [B] a monotonic
transformation of each player’s utility function.
The two part [A]’s in the two previous sentences show that games and game mor-
phisms are built on forms and form morphisms. Relatedly, Theorem 3.2 constructs
a “forgetful” functor from NCG to NCF, which is the category of node-and-choice
forms in SF = Streufert 2020. SF, in turn, constructed a “forgetful” functor from
NCF to NCP, which is the category of node-and-choice preforms in SP = Streufert
2018. In this fashion, the results in these predecessor papers are made formally ac-
cessible. In addition, Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 provide four characterizations
of NCG isomorphisms. Finally, Proposition 3.6 and its preceding paragraph derive
more than 25 fundamental properties of NCG isomorphisms.
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Translating Styles. Section 4 defines two NCG subcategories for the two styles
of Figure 1.2. In particular, CsqG is the subcategory for choice-sequence games
like that of Figure 1.2(a), and CsetG is the subcategory for choice-set games like
that of Figure 1.2(b).
Theorem 4.5 compares NCG and CsqG via the concept of isomorphic inclusion
(i.e. isomorphic enclosure) from SF = Streufert 2020. In particular, the theorem
shows that the entire category NCG is “isomorphically included” in CsqG (sym-
bolically NCG ⊆˙ CsqG) in the sense that each NCG game is (NCG) isomor-
phic to a CsqG game. Thus, since the converse (obviously) holds, Corollary 4.6
states that NCG and CsqG are “isomorphically equivalent” (symbolically NCG
'˙ CsqG). Similar results are then derived for CsetG. In particular, Corollary 4.9
shows that NCGa˜ '˙ CsetG, where NCGa˜ is the subcategory for (general style)
games with no-absentmindedness.6
Translating Concepts. Intuitively, fundamental game-theoretic concepts like
Nash-equilibrium, no-absentmindedness, and perfect-information should not vary
between two equivalent games. Formally, Proposition 3.7, Corollary 4.3, and Corol-
lary 4.4 show that these three concepts are invariant to NCG isomorphisms. This
starts to address Section 1.1’s broad question: Games and styles can be “translated”
by isomorphisms, and from this perspective, the “fundamental” (i.e. “translatable”)
concepts are the ones that are isomorphically invariant.
Further, Proposition 4.1 shows that, conveniently, any isomorphic inclusion or
equivalence can be restricted by any invariant concept. Thus, for example, the
aforementioned Corollary 4.6 implies that NCGa˜ '˙ CsqGa˜, where CsqGa˜ is the
subcategory for choice-sequence games with no-absentmindedness. So, naturally,
the aforementioned Corollary 4.9 implies that NCGa˜, CsqGa˜, and CsetG are
all isomorphically equivalent. This convenience and naturalness suggest that Sec-
tion 1.1’s broad question is being addressed in a useful way.
Translating Results. In accord with Section 1.1, the above suggests a larger
agenda, namely, the systematic translation of results across different styles. Such
an overarching translation system promises conceptual benefits. Foremost in the
author’s mind is the formal synthesis of results and questions from the many dis-
ciplines and subdisciplines which are each studying some version of game theory.
There seems to be much to gain because there is so much diversity.
In addition, the author has been made aware of another benefit, namely, that
categorical translations between games may allow for syntactic translations be-
tween the logical languages that are interpreted in those games. This would accord
with the correspondence theory of van Benthem 2001, and Conradie, Ghilardi, and
Palmigiano 2014.
Categorical Reformulations. Finally, in a different direction, it appears that some
game-theoretic concepts can be reformulated in categorical terms, and that such
categorical reformulations could conceivably lead to new game-theoretic results in
the future. One example may be Section 3.4’s reformulation of the game-theoretic
concept of “subgame” in terms of a special NCG morphism called a “subgame
inclusion”. Another example may be that monotonic transformations are naturally
6These isomorphic equivalences unify and extend earlier ad hoc equivalences by Kline and
Luckraz 2016 and Streufert 2019. Similar categorical results promise to extend the ad hoc equiv-
alences in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.3. This future research will concern the two
games in Figure 1.3.
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built into the definition of an NCG morphism (and that affine transformations can
naturally define an NCG subcategory as suggested in note 1).
Related Literature. Other papers have also developed categories for games or
game forms.7 Most relevant is Bolt, Hedges, and Zahn 2019, which defines a cate-
gory admitting (finite-horizon) Bayesian game forms.8 SP = Streufert 2018, SF =
Streufert 2020, and the present paper all differ from their paper by admitting both
infinite-horizon trees and arbitrary information sets, by defining morphisms which
are not isomorphisms, and by using very different categorical tools. Further, the
present paper differs by building a category for games, as opposed to game forms.
Other contributions develop categories which are less relevant to this paper be-
cause their information sets are less general. These include Lapitsky 1999 and
Jime´nez 2014, which define categories for simultaneous-move games, and Machover
and Terrington 2014 which defines a category for some cooperative games. Also
included are Abramsky, Jagadeesan, and Malacaria 2000, Hyland and Ong 2000,
and McCusker 2000, which develop categories for some specialized games in com-
puter science. Lastly included are Honsell, Lenisa, and Redamalla 2012, Abramsky
and Winschel 2017, Hedges 2018, and Ghani, Kupke, Lambert, and Forsberg 2018,
which define categories for various games with relatively trivial information sets.
1.4. Organization
Section 2 reviews the category Tree for functioned trees, the category NCP for
node-and-choice preforms, and the category NCF for node-and-choice forms (all
from SP = Streufert 2018 and SF = Streufert 2020). In addition, Section 2 defines
subtrees, subpreforms, and subforms; and provides new results about how tree
morphisms interact with plays. Next, Section 3 defines and develops the category
NCG for node-and-choice games. Finally, Section 4 studies some of this new
category’s subcategories. Several proofs and many lemmas are relegated to the
appendices: Appendix A concerns Tree, Appendix B concerns NCP, Appendix C
concerns NCF, and Appendix D concerns NCG.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Explicitness for novice category theorists and others
This paper builds upon SP = Streufert 2018 and SF = Streufert 2020. It is hoped
that these three papers can be understood by readers from economics, computer
science, logic, and mathematics. Many such readers know little category theory,
and these readers can benefit from the fact that the papers presume little prior
knowledge of the subject. In fact, aside from tangents, the papers presume only
7In addition, other papers study equivalences between games without using category theory.
These include the references in note 6, as well as McKinsey 1950, Thompson 1952, Dalkey 1953,
Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, Bonanno 1992, Elmes and Reny 1994, and van Benthem 2014 (pages
43–51).
8This sentence may require explanation because the focus of their paper is elsewhere. In
particular, the larger contribution of their paper is to systematically compose game fragments
(called “open games”) by regarding these fragments as morphisms in a category which has no
parallel here. In addition, morphisms between the fragments are defined via bisimulation. Very
roughly, the fragments are embellished game forms. Accordingly, the paper’s Section 4.7 shows
that a standard Bayesian game can be modelled as a fragment (i.e. an “open game”) plus a root
node and utility functions (called a “context”).
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the definitions of category, isomorphism, functor, and full subcategory. These basic
concepts can be found in the early pages of the books by Simmons 2011, Awodey
2010, and Mac Lane 1998 (arranged in descending order of accessibility).
Because the intended audience includes novice category theorists, all three pa-
pers try to avoid the notational and conceptual shortcuts that expert category
theorists use to suppress routine details that are of no interest to them. For exam-
ple, the structure of a structured set is kept explicit, contrary to the habits of expert
category theorists who routinely make such a structure implicit. More generally,
because the intended audience spans several disciplines, these papers try to avoid
the specialized shortcuts that any of the disciplines use to suppress routine details.
For example, a function is kept distinct from its graph, contrary to the habits of
expert set theorists who routinely identify a function with its graph (similar dis-
tinctions are made between a correspondence and its graph, and between a relation
and its graph). Such matters are discussed more fully in SF Section 1.6.
In addition, this paper is yet more explicit than SP and SF in three minor re-
gards. [1] Let the superscript T (rather than −1) mark the transpose of a function
or correspondence (by default, transposes are correspondences). [2] For a function
f :X→Y , define f¯ :P(X)→P(Y ) by f¯(A) = {f(x)|x∈A}.9 Similarly, for a correspon-
dence G:X⇒Y , define G¯:P(X)→P(Y ) by G¯(A) = ∪x∈AG(x). [3] For a function
f :X→Y and a set A ⊆ X, let f |sjA be the surjective restriction of f to A. For
example, if f :R→R is defined by f(x) = 2x, then f |sj[0,1]:[0, 1]→[0, 2].
At the same time, this paper is less explicit than SP and SF in one significant
regard: Here it is assumed that trees, preforms, forms, and games are implicitly
accompanied by their components and derivatives. See Table 2.1 for an overview.
2.2. The category Tree
2.2.1. Basics. Let T be a set of nodes t. A (functioned) tree (SP Section 2.1) is
a pair (T, p) such that there are to ∈ T and X ⊆ T satisfying
[T1] p is a nonempty function from Tr{to} onto X, and
[T2] (∀t∈Tr{to})(∃m∈N1) pm(t) = to.10
Call p the (immediate) predecessor function, call to the root node, and call X the set
of decision nodes. Further, define a tree’s stage function k:T→N0 by [a] k(to) = 0
and [b] (∀t∈Tr{to}) pk(t)(t) = to. Define its (strict) precedence relation ≺ on
T by (∀t1∈T, t2∈T ) t1 ≺ t2 iff (∃m∈N1) t1 = pm(t2). Relatedly, define its weak
precedence relation 4 on T by (∀t1∈T, t2∈T ) t1 4 t2 iff (∃m∈N0) t1 = pm(t2).
Finally, let Z be the collection of maximal chains in (T,4). Call Z ∈ Z a play. Z
can be split into the (possibly empty) collection Zft of finite plays and the (possibly
empty) collection Zinft of infinite plays. The above are developed in SP Sections
2.1–2.2, and summarized here within the first section of Table 2.1. (By assumption,
each tree is implicitly accompanied by all its derivatives.)
9An alternative notation for f¯ would have been Pf , as in Mac Lane 1998, page 13.
10Let N0 = {0, 1, 2, ...} and N1 = {1, 2, ...}. Further, for any m ∈ N0 and any function f , let
fm(x) be the result of applying f to x, m times.
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(T, p) (Functioned) Tree satisfying [T1]–[T2]
T set of nodes t
p immediate-predecessor function
to

root node
X

set of decision nodes t
k

stage function
≺  strict precedence relation
4  weak precedence relation
Z  collection of plays (i.e., maximal chains) Z
Zft  collection of finite plays Z
Zinft  collection of infinite plays Z
P

strict-predecessor correspondence (Section 2.2) *
Π Preform (T,C,⊗) satisfying [P1]–[P3]
C set of choices c
⊗ node-and-choice operator
F

feasibility correspondence
H  collection of information sets H
q

previous-choice function
S  collection of grand strategies S (Section 2.3) *
ζ

grand-strategy-to-play function (Section 2.3) *
Φ Form (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) satisfying [F1]–[F3]
I set of players i
Ci player i’s set of choices c
Xi

player i’s set of decision nodes t
Hi  player i’s collection of information sets H
Si  player i’s collection of strategies Si (Section 2.4) *
Γ Game (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗, (Ui)i∈I) satisfying [G1]–[G2] *
Ui player i’s utility function (Section 3.1) *
Table 2.1. Trees, preforms, forms, and games are implicitly accom-
panied by their components and derivatives (

). The symbol * means
new to this paper.
A further definition will be useful. Consider a tree (T, p) (accompanied by its ≺),
and define P :T⇒T by P (t) = {t[∈T |t[≺t}. Call P the strict-predecessor corre-
spondence.11 As might be expected, Lemma A.1(j,g,f) shows that P (to) = ∅, that
(∀t∈Tr{to}) p(t) ∈ P (t), and that (∀t∈T ) P (t) = {pm(t)|k(t)≥m>0}. P is the
last item in the first section of Table 2.1.
A tree morphism (SP Section 2.3) is a triple θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] such that
(T, p) and (T ′, p′) are (functioned) trees,
[t1] τ :T→T ′ and
[t2] { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr } ⊆ p′ gr.
The category Tree (SP Section 2.4) has trees as its objects and tree morphisms as
its arrows. SP Section 2.5 shows that Tree is isomorphic to the full subcategory of
Grph for converging arborescences.
11An alternative notation for P (t) would have been ↓≺(t), where ↓ suggests order theory’s
down-set, as in Davey and Priestley 2002, page 20.
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2.2.2. Subtrees. Let a tree inclusion be a Tree morphism that satisfies T ⊆ T ′
and τ = incT,T ′ , where incT,T ′ is the inclusion function
12 from T into T ′. Further, let
a subtree inclusion be a tree inclusion that also satisfies T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}. Finally,
call (T, p) a subtree of (T ′, p′) iff [(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is a subtree inclusion.13
Lemma A.5 shows that one tree (T, p) is a subtree of another tree (T ′, p′) iff
T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} and p = p′|sjTr{to}. Also, Lemma A.6 takes a tree (T ′, p′) and
constructs the subtree starting from an arbitrary node in X ′. Both Lemma A.5’s
characterization and Lemma A.6’s construction are consistent14 with the standard
concept of a subgame in Selten 1975 and Myerson 1991, page 184.
2.2.3. How Tree morphisms interact with plays. SP Sections 2.3 and
2.4 show the various ways in which Tree morphisms and isomorphisms preserve
the various components and derivatives of trees. The SP results about plays are
especially important to this paper because plays appear in the domains of utility
functions. For example, the following proposition shows that Tree isomorphisms
preserve plays in a strong sense.
Proposition 2.1. If [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is an isomorphism, then τ¯ |sjZ is a bijection
from Z onto Z ′. (SP Proposition 2.7(h,i).)
Tree morphisms, as opposed to isomorphisms, preserve plays in a much weaker
sense. In particular, SP Proposition 2.4(g,h) shows that if [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a
morphism, then (∀Z∈Z)(∃Z ′∈Z ′) τ¯(Z) ⊆ Z ′. Stronger results seem to be pre-
cluded by examples like that of Figure 2.1.15 There Z = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}} and
Z ′ = {{10, 17}, {10, 11, 12}, {10, 11, 13}, {10, 11, 14, 15}, {10, 11, 14, 16}}. Since the
example’s τ maps each source node n to the target node 10+n, there is no Z ∈ Z
such that τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. Thus the image of a source play is generally not a target play.
1
2
3
4
(T, p)
10 11
17
12
13
14 15
16
(T ′, p′)
θ
Figure 2.1. The source tree and target tree of the morphism θ =
[(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] defined in note 15. The function τ :T→T ′ maps each
source node n to the target node 10+n.
Relatedly, Proposition 2.2 below describes only limited ways in which a mor-
phism θ preserves plays. For part (a), say that a chain S ⊆ T in a tree (T, p)
12In general, suppose A ⊆ B. Then incA,B is the function f :A→B defined by (∀a∈A) f(a) = a.
13Since a subtree inclusion is a special kind of tree inclusion, a subtree is a special kind of
included tree. Although it might seem natural to call any included tree a “subtree”, the present
terminology accords with the extremely well-known concept of subgame-perfection (Selten 1975).
14The only difference is that subtrees here must have more than one node simply because trees
here must have more than one node (SF Lemma A.1(a)).
15The example θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is defined by T = {1, 2, 3, 4}, pgr = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)},
T ′ = {10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17}, p′ gr = {(11, 10), (17, 10), (12, 11), (13, 11), (14, 11), (15, 14),
(16, 14)}, and τ gr = {(1, 11), (2, 12), (3, 13), (4, 14)}.
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is consecutive iff (∀s1∈S, s2∈S, t∈T ) s1 ≺ t ≺ s2 implies t ∈ S. As might be ex-
pected, Lemma A.1(t) shows every play is a consecutive chain. In a similar vein,
part (a) of the proposition below shows that the image of each source play Z is a
consecutive chain of target nodes.
Part (b) shows that the image of each source play Z is preceded by P ′◦τ(to),
which is conveniently independent of Z. For example, in Figure 2.1, P ′◦τ(to) =
P ′◦τ(1) = P ′(11) = {10}.
For part (c), consider an arbitrary tree (T, p) and let the end of a finite play be
its maximum (an infinite play does not have an end). Then consider a morphism
θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and define
Zθ = Zinft ∪ {Z∈Zft | (/∃t′+∈T ′) τ(maxZ)≺′ t′+ }.
Call Zθ the collection of θ’s end-preserved source plays.16 Thus an infinite source
play is end-preserved by definition, and a finite source play is end-preserved iff its
end’s image is not succeeded by a target node (conveniently τ(maxZ) = max τ¯(Z)
by Lemma A.7(g)). For example, in Figure 2.1, the end-preserved source plays are
{1, 2} and {1, 3}. Finally, the proposition’s part (c) shows that the end-preserved
source plays are identical to the source plays Z that are mapped to target plays
by the rule Z 7→ P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z). In this sense, the end-preserved source plays are
the source plays that can be reasonably mapped to target plays. For example, in
Figure 2.1, the end-preserved plays {1, 2} and {1, 3} are mapped to the target plays
P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯({1, 2}) = {10}∪{11, 12} = {10, 11, 12} and
P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯({1, 3}) = {10}∪{11, 13} = {10, 11, 13}.
In contrast, {1, 4} is not end-preserved, and accordingly, P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯({1, 4}) =
{10}∪{11, 14} = {10, 11, 14} is not a target play.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a morphism. Then the
following hold.
(a) (∀Z∈Z) τ¯(Z) is a consecutive chain.
(b) (∀Z∈Z) P ′(min τ¯(Z)) = P ′◦τ(to).
(c) Zθ = {Z∈Z |P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)∈Z ′ }, where Zθ is the collection of θ’s end-
preserved source plays. (Lemma A.7(d,f,o).)
A morphism θ is said to be end-preserving iff Zθ = Z. Proposition 2.3 provides
three broad classes of end-preserving morphisms. For such a morphism, Propo-
sition 2.2(c) implies that every source play is sent to a target play by the map
Z 3 Z 7→ P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. When the morphism is a subtree inclusion (as in
the Proposition 2.3(b)), this map is injective because of the injectivity of the in-
clusion function τ = incT,T ′ . When the morphism is an isomorphism, the map
simplifies to Z 3 Z 7→ τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′ by Proposition 2.3(c)[2], and further, the map is
bijective by Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a morphism. Then the
following hold.
(a) If (T, p) has only infinite plays, then Zθ = Z.
(b) If θ is a subtree inclusion, then Zθ = Z.
(c) If θ is an isomorphism, then [1] Zθ = Z and [2] P ′◦τ(to) = ∅. (Proof A.8.)
16The symbol Zθ does not belong in Table 2.1 because it is derived from a morphism θ rather
than from a tree (T, p).
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2.3. The category NCP
Let C be a set of choices c. A triple Π = (T,C,⊗) is a (node-and-choice) preform
(SF Section 2.1)17 iff 18
[P1] there is a correspondence 18 F :T⇒C and a to∈T
such that ⊗ is a bijection from F gr onto Tr{to},
[P2] (T, p) is a (functioned) tree where p:Tr{to}→FT(C) 18
is defined 19 by pgr = {(t], t)∈T 2|(∃c∈C)(t, c, t])∈⊗gr}, and
[P3] H partitions FT(C) 18
where H ⊆ P(T ) is defined by H = {FT(c)|c∈C}.
Call ⊗ the node-and-choice operator, and let t⊗c denote its value at (t, c) ∈ F gr.
Call F the feasibility correspondence, call F (t) the set of feasible choices at node
t, call to the root node, call p the immediate-predecessor function, and call H the
collection of information sets. For convenience, let X equal FT(C), and call X the
set of decision nodes. Further, define the previous-choice function q:Tr{to}→C
by qgr = {(t], c)∈T×C|(∃t∈T )(t, c, t])∈⊗gr}. The above concepts are developed in
SP Sections 3.1–3.2, and summarized within Table 2.1’s second section. Note [P2]
defines the tree (T, p), which in turn defines the preform’s k, ≺, 4, Z, Zft, Zinft,
and P by means of the previous subsection.20 (By assumption, each preform Π is
implicitly accompanied by all its components and derivatives.)
Two further constructions from a preform Π will be useful. First, define S =
{ S⊆C | (∀H∈H) |S∩F¯ (H)|=1 }. Call each S ∈ S a grand strategy. Thus a grand
strategy names exactly one feasible choice at each information set. Second,
Lemma B.1 shows that, for each S ∈ S, there is exactly one Z ∈ Z such that
(∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Define ζ:S→Z accordingly. Call ζ the grand-strategy-to-
play function. S and ζ are the last two items in Table 2.1’s second section.
A preform morphism (SP Section 3.3) is a quadruple [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] such that Π
and Π ′ are preforms,
[p1] τ :T→T ′, δ:C→C ′, and
[p2] {(τ(t), δ(c), τ(t]))|(t, c, t])∈⊗gr} ⊆ ⊗′ gr.
The category NCP (SP Section 3.4) has preforms as its objects and preform mor-
phisms as its arrows. SP Theorem 3.9 shows there is a “forgetful” functor T from
NCP to Tree (there T is called “F”). See Figure 3.1 below.
17The definition of a preform originally appeared in SP Section 3.1. The definition there is
slightly less explicit.
18To be clear, F :T⇒C means that F is a correspondence from T to C, which means that F
is a triple (T,C, F gr) such that F gr ⊆ T×C (this accords with SF Section 2.1). In accord with
this paper’s Section 2.1, FT(c) = {t∈T |c∈F (t)} and FT(C) = ∪c∈CFT(c). The latter expression,
by the definition of FT(c), equals ∪c∈C{t∈T |c∈F (t)}, which equals {t∈T |(∃c∈C)c∈F (t)}, which
equals {t∈T |F (t)6=∅}.
19SP Lemma C.1(a) shows that [P1] implies the well-definition and surjectivity of the function
p. Thus, if [P1] holds, then [P2] holds iff both Tr{to} 6= ∅ and (∀t∈Tr{to})(∃m≥1) to = pm(t).
(This follows from inspecting the definition of a functioned tree.)
20SP Lemma C.1(b,c) implies that a preform’s to and X = FT(C) coincide with the underlying
tree’s to and X. Hence the symbols to and X are unambiguous. (Inconsequentially, SP uses the
notation F−1(C) rather than either the notation X or the notation FT(C).)
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Let a preform inclusion be an NCP morphism that satisfies T ⊆ T ′, τ = incT,T ′ ,
C ⊆ C ′, and δ = incC,C′ (where note 12 defines incA,B to be the inclusion function
from A to B). Further, let a subpreform inclusion be a preform inclusion that
also satisfies T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} and H ⊆ H′. Finally call Π a subpreform of Π ′ iff
[Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a subpreform inclusion.
Lemma B.2 shows that Π is a subpreform of Π ′ iff T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, C ⊆ C ′,
⊗ = ⊗|sjF gr , and H ⊆ H′. These four conditions are consistent with the standard
definition of a subgame in Selten 1975 (see note 14 for a trivial difference about the
minimal number of nodes). The condition H ⊆ H′ holds trivially if both Π and Π ′
have perfect-information.21
2.4. The category NCF
Let I be a set of players i. A (node-and-choice) form (SF Section 2.1) is a
quadruple Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) such that
[F1] (T,C,⊗) is an NCP preform where C = ∪i∈ICi,
[F2] (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Ci∩Cj = ∅, and
[F3] (∀t∈T )(∃i∈I) F (t) ⊆ Ci.
Each Ci is the set of choices that are assigned to player i. Further, define (Xi)i∈I at
each i by Xi = ∪c∈CiFT(c). Each Xi is the set of decision nodes that are assigned
to player i. Finally, define (Hi)i∈I at each i by Hi = {FT(c)|c∈Ci}. Each Hi is
the collection of information sets that are assigned to player i. The above concepts
are developed in SF Section 2.1, and summarized within Table 2.1’s third section.
Note [F1] defines the form’s preform Π = (T,C,⊗), which in turn determines the
form’s F , to, p, q, H, X, k, ≺, 4, P , Z, Zft, Zinft, S, and ζ by means of the
previous subsection. (By assumption, each form Φ is implicitly accompanied by all
its components and derivatives.)
One more construction from a form Φ will be useful. For each player i, define
Si = { Si⊆Ci | (∀H∈Hi) |Si∩F¯ (H)|=1 }. Call each Si ∈ Si a (pure) strategy for
player i.22 Thus a strategy for player i names exactly one feasible choice at each
of the player’s information sets. The following proposition shows that there is
a straightforward bijection between grand strategies S ∈ S and strategy profiles
(Si)i∈I ∈ Πi∈ISi.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose Φ is a form. Then S 3 S 7→ (S∩Ci)i∈I ∈ Πi∈ISi is
a bijection. Its inverse is S 3 ∪i∈ISi 7 →(Si)i∈I ∈ Πi∈ISi. (Proof C.2.)
A form morphism (SF Section 2.2)23 is a quintuple [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] such that Φ and
Φ′ are forms,
21Perfect-information appears later in Section 4.2. It is the property of having singleton infor-
mation sets. In this event, H = {{t}|t∈X} and H′ = {{t′}|t′∈X′}. Thus H ⊆ H′ follows from
X ⊆ X′, which follows from Lemma A.4(c).
22Remark [2] after SF Proposition 2.1 shows how NCF allows vacuous players, that is, players
i for which Ci = ∅. If i is vacuous, Si = {∅}. In other words, the only strategy of a vacuous
player is ∅.
23The definition here is equivalent to the definition of an NCF morphism in SF Section 2.2:
[f1]’s last two statements and [f2] are together identical to SF [FM1]; [f1]’s first statement is
identical to SF [FM2]; and [f3] is identical to SF [FM3].
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[f1] ι:I→I ′, τ :T→T ′, δ:C→C ′,
[f2] { (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr } ⊆ ⊗′gr, and
[f3] (∀i∈I) δ¯(Ci) ⊆ C ′ι(i),
The category NCF (SF Section 2.3) has forms as its objects and form morphisms
as its arrows. SF Theorem 2.7 shows there is a “forgetful” functor P from NCF to
NCP. See Figure 3.1 below.
Let a form inclusion be an NCF morphism that satisfies I ⊆ I ′, ι= incI,I′ ,
T ⊆ T ′, τ = incT,T ′ , C ⊆C ′, and δ= incC,C′ . Further, let a subform inclusion be
a form inclusion that also satisfies T = {t′∈T ′|to4t′} and H⊆H′. Finally call Φ
a subform of Φ′ iff [Φ,Φ′, idI,I′ , idT,T ′ , idC,C′ ] is a subform inclusion. Lemma C.3
shows that Φ is a subform of Φ′ iff it satisfies five conditions which are consistent
with the standard concept of a subgame in Selten 1975 (see note 14 for a trivial
difference).
3. The Category of Node-and-Choice Games
3.1. Objects
A (node-and-choice) game is a quintuple Γ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗, (Ui)i∈I) such that
[G1] (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) is an (NCF) form and
[G2] (∀i∈I) Ui is a surjective real-valued function from Z.
Condition [G1] defines the game’s form Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗), which in turn defines
the game’s C, Π, F , to, p, q, X, (Xi)i∈I , H, (Hi)i∈I , k, ≺, 4, Z, Zft, Zinft, P ,
S, (Si)i∈I , and ζ by means of Section 2. All these components and derivatives are
listed in Table 2.1, and by assumption, each game Γ is implicitly accompanied by
all of them. Thus the symbol Z appearing in [G2] is the game’s collection of plays.
At the same time, the symbol Ui appearing in [G2] is new. Call Ui the utility
function of player i. In accord with the explicit notation of Section 2.1, U¯i(Z) is
the range of Ui. The surjectivity in [G2] requires that the codomain of Ui is U¯i(Z).
Call U¯i(Z) the set of player-i utilities ui.
3.2. Arrows
A game morphism is a sextuple γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] such that Γ and Γ ′ are
games,
[g1] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an (NCF) form morphism,
[g2] β = ( βi : U¯i(Zθ)→U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′) )i∈I ,
[g3] (∀i∈I) βi is weakly increasing, and
[g4] (∀i∈I, Z∈Zθ) βi(Ui(Z)) = U ′ι(i)(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)),
where θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ],24 and Zθ is θ’s collection of end-preserved source
plays, as defined in Section 2.2.3.
Essentially, conditions [g2]–[g4] require that each βi preserves the ordinal content
of the source player-i utility function Ui over as many plays Z as possible. The
essential background is Proposition 2.2(c), which shows that the members of Zθ
24Equivalently, by [g1] and Figure 3.1’s functors, θ = T1◦P1([Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]).
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(that is, the end-preserved source plays) coincide with the source plays Z that are
mapped to target plays by the rule Z 7→ P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z). Condition [g2] states that
the domain of each βi consists of the player-i source utilities that are generated by
the end-preserved source plays. These utilities are mapped by βi to a player-ι(i)
target utilities. Next, condition [g3] requires that each βi is weakly increasing in
the sense that (∀i∈I, u1i∈U¯i(Zθ), u2i∈U¯i(Zθ))
u1i ≥ u2i ⇒ βi(u1i ) ≥ βi(u2i ).
Finally, conditions [g2]–[g4] imply that (∀i∈I, Z1∈Zθ, Z2∈Zθ)
Ui(Z
1)≥Ui(Z2) ⇒ U ′ι(i)(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z1))≥U ′ι(i)(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z2)).
In contrast, [g2]–[g4] say nothing about the source utility of a (non-end-preserved)
source play in ZrZθ. Arguably, such a source utility should say nothing about tar-
get utilities. For example, recall Figure 2.1. There, {1, 4} is in ZrZθ. Arguably,
the source utility assigned to the source play {1, 4} should imply nothing about
the target utility assigned to the target play {10, 11, 14, 15} because the connection
between {1, 4} and {10, 11, 14, 15} is so nebulous.
Finally, [g2] and [g4] can often be simplified. Specifically, assume [g1]. Then Zθ
simplifies to Z if either (i) there are no finite source plays, or (ii) θ is a subtree inclu-
sion, or (iii) θ is an isomorphism (all via Proposition 2.3). Further, P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)
simplifies to τ¯(Z) if θ is an isomorphism (via Proposition 2.3(c)[2]).
3.3. The category itself
This paragraph, the next two paragraphs, and Theorem 3.1 define the category
NCG, which is called the category of node-and-choice games. Let an object be a
game Γ . Let an arrow be a game morphism γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]. Let source, target,
and identity be
[Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]src = Γ,
[Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]trg = Γ ′, and
idΓ = [Γ, Γ, idI , idT , idC , (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ],
where each member of {idI , idT , idC}∪ {idU¯i(Z)|i∈I} is an identity in Set.
For composition, consider γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] and γ′ = [Γ ′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′] along
with θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and θ′ = [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′]. Firstly, for each player
i, define β′ι(i)∗βi : βTi (U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
)) → U¯ ′′ι′◦ι(i)(Z ′′) by
β′ι(i)∗βi(ui) = β′ι(i)(βi(ui)).
Straightforwardly, the codomain equals the codomain of β′ι(i) by [g2] for γ
′ at i′ =
ι(i). Less clearly, the domain is the set of ui for which the righthand side is well-
defined. To spell this out, note that U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) is the domain of β′ι(i) by [g2] for γ
′
at i′ = ι(i). Thus βTi (U¯
′
ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
)) consists of the arguments of βi which βi maps to
an argument of β′ι(i). This complexity arises because [a] U¯
′
ι(i)(Z ′) is the codomain
of βi by [g2], and [b] this may be larger than U¯
′
ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) when Z ′ is larger than
Z ′ θ′ .
Secondly and lastly, define
γ′◦γ = [Γ, Γ ′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ, (β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ))i∈I ],
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where Zθ′◦θ is θ′◦θ’s collection of end-preserved plays, as defined in Section 2.2.3.
Intuitively, Zθ′◦θ consists of the plays from (T, p) that are “twice end-preserved”.
If Z ′ θ′ = Z ′ (that is, if the second morphism is end-preserving), then Zθ′◦θ = Zθ
(Lemma A.11(b)), and further, for each player i
β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ) = β′ι(i)◦βi
(Lemma D.1(b)). This important special case arises when (T ′, p′) has only infinite
plays, or when θ′ is a subtree inclusion, or when θ′ is an isomorphism (all by
Proposition 2.3 applied to θ′).
Theorem 3.1. NCG is a category. (Proof D.3.)
utilities, players,
choices,
info sets,
nodes and
precedence
NCG −→F NCF −→P NCP −→T Tree
as in SF and SP
Figure 3.1. The “forgetful” functors of Theorem 3.2, SF Theorem 2.7,
and SP Theorem 3.9 (there T is denoted “F”).
As already seen, the definition of a game incorporates an NCF form, and the
definition of a game morphism incorporates an NCF morphism. Correspondingly,
Theorem 3.2 shows there is a “forgetful” functor F from NCG to NCF. Similarly,
SF Theorem 2.7 shows there is a functor P from NCF to NCP, and SP Theorem 3.9
shows there is a functor T from NCP to Tree (there T is denoted “F”).
All three functors are shown in Figure 3.1. Three of the figure’s column headers
end in commas. This conveys the notion that each column subsumes any column(s)
to its right. In particular, the category (NCG) in the first column concerns not
only utilities, but also players, choices, information sets, nodes, and precedence.
Similarly, the category (NCF) in the second column concerns not only players, but
also choices, information sets, nodes, and precedence. Finally, the category (NCP)
in the third column concerns not only choices and information sets, but also nodes
and precedence.
Theorem 3.2. Define F from NCG to NCF by
F0 : (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗, (Ui)i∈I) 7→ (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) and
F1 : [Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β] 7→ [F0(Γ ),F0(Γ ′), ι, τ, δ].
Then F is a well-defined functor. (Proof D.4.)
3.4. Subgames
Let a game inclusion be a morphism [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] which satisfies
I ⊆ I ′, ι= incI,I′ , T ⊆T ′, τ = incT,T ′ , C ⊆C ′, δ= incC,C′ , and
(∀i∈I) both U¯i(Zθ)⊆ U¯ ′i(Z ′) and βi = incU¯i(Zθ),U¯ ′i(Z′),
where θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ]. Further, let a subgame inclusion be a game inclusion
which also satisfies T = {t′∈T ′|to4t′} and H⊆H′. In this important special case, θ
is a subtree inclusion [easily, by Lemmas D.5(a⇒b), C.3(a⇒b), and B.2(a⇒b)], and
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thus Zθ = Z [by Proposition 2.3(b)]. Thus, without loss of generality, a subgame
inclusion has the form
[Γ, Γ ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ , (incU¯i(Z),U¯ ′i(Z′))i∈I ].
Call Γ a subgame of Γ ′ iff [Γ, Γ ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ , (incU¯i(Z),U¯ ′i(Z′))i∈I ] is a
subgame inclusion.
Proposition 3.3 characterizes a subgame without reference to morphisms. The
characterization’s six conditions are consistent with the standard concept of a sub-
game in Selten 1975 (see note 14 for a trivial difference about the minimal number
of nodes).
Proposition 3.3. Suppose Γ and Γ ′ are NCG games. Then Γ is a sub-
game of Γ ′ iff [1] I ⊆ I ′, [2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, [3] (∀i∈I)Ci⊆C ′i, [4] ⊗=⊗′|sjF gr ,
[5] H⊆H′, and [6] (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) Ui(Z) = U ′i(P ′(to)∪Z). (Lemma D.5(a⇔c).)
3.5. Isomorphisms
Theorem 3.4. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] is an NCG morphism. Then the
following hold.
(a) γ is an isomorphism iff every member of {ι, τ, δ}∪{βi|i∈I} is a bijection.
(b) If γ is an isomorphism, then γ−1 = [Γ ′, Γ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1, (β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ].
(Proof D.8.)
The following corollary expresses Theorem 3.4(a)’s characterization in alternative
ways. In parts (b) and (d), βi is strictly increasing iff (∀u1i∈U¯i(Zθ), u2i∈U¯i(Zθ))
u1i > u
2
i implies βi(u
1
i ) > βi(u
2
i ).
Corollary 3.5. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] is an NCG morphism. Then the
following are equivalent
(a) γ is an isomorphism.
(b) ι, τ , and δ are bijections and (∀i∈I) βi is strictly increasing.
(c) [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism and (∀i∈I) βi is a bijection.
(d) [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism and (∀i∈I) βi is strictly increasing.
Proof. (a)⇔(b). By Theorem 3.4(a), it suffices to show that each βi is bijective iff
it is strictly increasing. This equivalence holds because each βi is weakly increasing
by [g3]. (a)⇔(c). Theorem 3.4(a) and SF Theorem 2.4(a). (b)⇔(d). SF Theorem
2.4(a). 2
Proposition 3.6 lists several properties of game isomorphisms. Parts (c)–(h) are
new. Meanwhile, parts (a) and (b) are derived, via Figure 3.1’s functors, from the
properties of tree isomorphisms in Propositions 2.1 and 2.3(c). Further, nineteen ad-
ditional properties of game isomorphisms can be similarly derived, via Figure 3.1’s
functor F, from the nineteen properties of form isomorphisms in SF Proposition
2.6.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] is an NCG isomorphism. Then the
following hold.
(a) τ¯ |sjZ is a bijection from Z onto Z ′.
(b) [1] Zθ = Z where θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ], and [2] P ′◦τ(to) = ∅.
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(c) (∀H∈H) δ|sj
F¯ (H)
is a bijection from F¯ (H) onto F¯ ′(τ¯(H)).
(d) (∀i∈I) δ¯|sjSi is a bijection from Si onto S ′ι(i).
(e) δ¯|sjS is a bijection from S onto S ′.
(f) τ¯ |sjZ◦ζ = ζ ′◦δ¯|sjS .
(g) (∀i∈I) βi is a strictly increasing bijection from U¯i(Z) onto U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′).
(h) (∀i∈I) βi◦Ui = U ′ι(i)◦τ¯ |sjZ . (Proof D.9.)
3.6. Nash-equilibria
Consider an NCG game Γ . Recall from Proposition 2.4 that there is a straight-
forward bijection between the collection Πi∈ISi of strategy profiles and the collec-
tion S of grand strategies. A grand strategy S ∈ S is a Nash-equilibrium iff
(∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) Ui◦ζ(S) ≥ Ui◦ζ((SrCi)∪S+i ).
Proposition 3.7. Suppose [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] is an NCG isomorphism. Then
(∀S∈S) S is a Nash-equilibrium in Γ iff δ¯(S) is a Nash-equilibrium in Γ ′.
(Proof D.10.)
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4.1. Isomorphic Inclusion
Isomorphic inclusion (SF Sections 3.2 and 3.3)25 is a means of comparing full
subcategories. It is recapitulated here with slight modifications. In general, con-
sider two full subcategories A and B of some overarching category Z. Then A is
isomorphically included in B (in symbols, A ⊆˙ B) iff every object of A is isomor-
phic (in Z) to an object of B. Conveniently, isomorphic inclusions can be composed
in the sense that A ⊆˙ B and B ⊆˙ C imply A ⊆˙ C.
In addition, let A '˙ B mean that both A ⊆˙ B and A ⊇˙ B hold. Call '˙ isomor-
phic equivalence. Isomorphic equivalence implies the standard categorical concept
of equivalence in Mac Lane 1998, page 18. Clearly isomorphic equivalences can be
composed. Further, the following proposition shows that isomorphic inclusions and
equivalences can be restricted by isomorphically invariant properties.26
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that A and B are full subcategories of Z, and that r
is an invariant property defined for the objects of Z. Let Ar be the full subcategory
of A for objects satisfying r, and let Br be the full subcategory of B for objects
satisfying r. Then (a) A ⊆˙ B implies Ar ⊆˙ Br. Further (b) A '˙ B implies Ar '˙
Br. ((a) is SF Proposition 3.6. (b) holds by two applications of (a).)
Finally, let A ⊂˙ B mean that A ⊆˙ B but not A ⊇˙ B. Call ⊂˙ strict isomorphic
inclusion. Because isomorphic inclusions can be composed, A ⊂˙ B and B ⊆˙ C
together imply A ⊂˙ C.27 Similarly, B ⊆˙ C and C ⊂˙ D together imply B ⊂˙ D.
25In SF, isomorphic inclusion is “isomorphic enclosure”. Further, [a] ⊆˙ is “→. ”, [b] '˙ is “↔. ”,
and [c] ⊃˙ is “←. 6→. ”.
26A subscript on a category name refers to an isomorphically invariant property. One example
is the “ r ” appearing in the following propositions. Examples in the next subsection are “ a˜ ” and
“ p ”.
27The proof is straightforward. SupposeA ⊂˙B andB ⊆˙C. ThenA ⊆˙C holds by composition.
To show A ⊇˙ C is false, suppose it were true. Then B ⊆˙ C and composition would imply A ⊇˙
B, which was assumed to be false.
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Further, the following shows that strict isomorphic inclusions can be readily con-
structed. In this result, a property defined on the objects of Z is said to be nontrivial
iff there is an object of Z which violates it.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that Z is a category, and that r is a nontrivial in-
variant property defined on the objects of Z. Let Zr be the full subcategory of Z for
objects satisfying r. Then Zr ⊂˙ Z. (Corollary of SF Proposition 3.4.)
4.2. No-absentmindedness and perfect-information
An NCF form Φ is said to have no-absentmindedness (Piccione and Rubinstein
1997; SF Section 2.4) iff (/∃H∈H, tA∈H, tB∈H) tA≺ tB . An NCG game Γ is
said to have no-absentmindedness iff its form has no-absentmindedness. Finally, let
NCGa˜ be the full NCG subcategory for games with no-absentmindedness.
Corollary 4.3. (a) No-absentmindedness is isomorphically invariant in NCG.
(b) NCGa˜ ⊂˙ NCG.
Proof. (a) follows from SF Proposition 2.8(b) and Figure 3.1’s “forgetful” functor
F. (b) holds by part (a), by Proposition 4.2 at Z =NCG, and by the existence of
a game which violates no-absentmindedness.28 2
An NCF form Φ is said to have perfect-information (Myerson 1991, page 185;
SF Section 2.4) iff (∀H∈H) |H| = 1. An NCG game Γ is said to have perfect-
information iff its form has perfect-information. Finally, let NCGp be the full
NCG subcategory for games with perfect-information.
Corollary 4.4. (a) Perfect-information is isomorphically invariant in NCG.
(b) NCGp ⊂˙ NCGa˜.
Proof. (a) follows from SF Proposition 2.9(b) and Figure 3.1’s “forgetful” functor
F. For (b), note [1] NCGa˜p ⊂˙ NCGa˜ by part (a), by Proposition 4.2 at Z =
NCGa˜, and by the existence of a no-absentminded game which violates perfect-
information.29 Also note [2] NCGa˜p = NCGp because perfect-information is
stronger than no-absentmindedness (SF note 14). [1] and [2] imply NCGp ⊂˙
NCGa˜. 2
Corollaries 4.3(b) and 4.4(b) contribute to game theory. The first formalizes
the notion that no-absentmindedness is a “substantial” property, and the second
formalizes the notion that perfect-information is “substantially” stronger than no-
absentmindedness. In contrast, Corollary 4.6 will show that the property of using
choice-sequences is “insubstantial”, and similarly, Corollary 4.9 will show a strong
sense in which the property of using choice-sets is “insubstantial”.
28SF note 13 defines a form Φ which violates no-absentmindedness. Note Z is the collection
consisting of {{}, (b)}, {{}, (a), (a, b)}, and {{}, (a), (a, a)}. Φ can be extended to a game by letting
U1 be any surjective real-valued function over Z.
29SF note 15 defines a form Φ which satisfies no-absentmindedness but not perfect-information.
Note Z is the collection consisting of {{}, (a), (a, c)}, {{}, (a), (a, d)}, {{}, (b), (b, c)}, and
{{}, (b), (b, d)}. Φ can be extended to a game by letting U1 and U2 be any surjective real-valued
functions over Z.
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4.3. Choice-sequence games
An NCF form Φ is said to use choice-sequences (SF Section 3.1) iff
[Csq1] T is a collection of finite sequences which contains {} and
[Csq2] (∀ (t, c, t])∈⊗gr) t⊕(c) = t],
where t⊕(c) is the concatenation of the sequence t with the one-element sequence
(c). Equivalently, the form is said to be a choice-sequence NCF form.
An NCG game Γ is said to use choice-sequences iff its form uses choice-
sequences. Let CsqG be the full NCG subcategory for choice-sequence games.
Theorem 4.5 shows that using choice-sequences is not restrictive in the sense that
NCG ⊆˙ CsqG.
Theorem 4.5. NCG ⊆˙ CsqG. In particular, suppose Γ is an NCG game.
Define Tˇ = { (q(pk(t)−`(t)))k(t)`=1 | t∈T }, define τˇ :T→Tˇ by τˇ(t) = (q(pk(t)−`(t)))k(t)`=1,
and define ⊗ˇ by surjectivity and
⊗ˇgr = { (τˇ(t), c, τˇ(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr }.
Then (a) (I, Tˇ, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗ˇ) is a form and ¯ˇτ |sjZ :Z→Zˇ is a bijection. Further, at each
i∈ I, define Uˇi = Ui◦(¯ˇτ |sjZ)−1. Then (b) Γˇ = (I, Tˇ, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗ˇ, (Uˇi)i∈I) is a CsqG
game, and (c) [Γ, Γˇ, idI , τˇ, idC , (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ] is an NCG isomorphism.
Proof. Let CsqF be the full NCF subcategory for choice-sequence forms. SF
Theorem 3.2(b) implies that [1] Φˇ = (I, Tˇ, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗ˇ) is a CsqF form and that
[2] [Φ, Φˇ, idI , τˇ, idC ] is an NCF isomorphism (SF uses ¯ rather than ˇ to suggest
“choice-sequence”). [1] and [2] imply the assumptions of Lemma D.11 when the
lemma’s Γ is Γ , and the lemma’s [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is [Φ, Φˇ, idI , τˇ, idC ]. Therefore, [1]
and the lemma’s (a) imply (a), [1] and the lemma’s (b) imply (b), and the lemma’s
(c) implies (c). 2
Corollary 4.6. NCG '˙ CsqG.
Proof. The forward direction follows from Theorem 4.5. The reverse direction is
immediate since, by definition, each CsqG game is an NCG game. 2
In the following corollary, CsqGa˜ is the full subcategory for choice-sequence
games with no-absentmindedness.
Corollary 4.7. NCGa˜ '˙ CsqGa˜.
Proof. Corollary 4.3(a) shows no-absentmindedness is invariant. Thus Corol-
lary 4.6 and Proposition 4.1(b) imply the result. 2
NCG ≃˙
C4.6
CsqG
⊂˙
C
4
.3
(b
)
⊂˙
NCGa˜ ≃˙
C4.7
CsqGa˜
Figure 4.1. Two isomorphic equivalences and two strict isomorphic
inclusions among NCG subcategories (C=Corollary).
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Figure 4.1 illustrates Corollaries 4.3(b), 4.6, and 4.7. The righthand inclusion
CsqGa˜ ⊂˙ CsqG was obtained by composing the other three inclusions (details in
note 27). Similarly, NCGa˜ ⊂˙ CsqG could be obtained by composing the lefthand
and top inclusions, and CsqGa˜ ⊂˙ NCG could be obtained by composing the
bottom and lefthand inclusions. The latter two could have been shown diagonally
in Figure 4.1.
4.4. Choice-set games
An NCF form Φ is said to use choice-sets (SF Section 4.1) iff
[Cset1] T is a collection of finite sets which contains {} and
[Cset2] (∀ (t, c, t])∈⊗gr) t∪{c} = t].
Equivalently, the form is said to be a choice-set NCF form.
An NCG game Γ is said to use choice-sets iff its form uses choice-sets. Let
CsetG be the full NCG subcategory for choice-set games. Theorem 4.8 shows that
CsqGa˜ ⊆˙ CsetG, where CsetGa˜ is the full NCG subcategory for choice-sequence
games with no-absentmindedness. Thus using choice-sets is not restrictive in a
qualified sense which excludes absentminded games. In the theorem statement, R is
the function mapping a finite sequence tˇ = (tˇ1, tˇ2, ...tˇkˇ(tˇ)) to its range {tˇ1, tˇ2, ...tˇkˇ(tˇ)}.
Theorem 4.8. CsqGa˜ ⊆˙ CsetG. In particular, suppose Γˇ is a CsqGa˜ game.
Define T = {R(tˇ)|tˇ∈Tˇ}, define τ :Tˇ→T by τ(tˇ) = R(tˇ), and define ⊗ by surjectivity
and
⊗gr = { (τ(tˇ), cˇ, τ(tˇ])) | (tˇ, cˇ, tˇ])∈⊗ˇgr }.
Then (a) (Iˇ , T, (Cˇ iˇ)iˇ∈Iˇ ,⊗) is a form and τ¯ |sjZˇ :Zˇ→Z is a bijection. Further, at each
iˇ ∈Iˇ, define Uiˇ = Uˇiˇ◦(τ¯ |sjZˇ)−1. Then (b) Γ = (Iˇ , T, (Cˇ iˇ)iˇ∈Iˇ ,⊗, (Uiˇ)iˇ∈Iˇ) is a CsetG
game, and (c) [Γˇ, Γ, idIˇ , τ, idCˇ , (id ¯ˇUiˇ(Zˇ))iˇ∈Iˇ ] is an NCG isomorphism.
Proof. Let CsetF be the full NCF subcategory for choice-set forms. SF The-
orem 4.2(b) implies that [1] Φ = (Iˇ , T, (Cˇ)iˇ∈Iˇ ,⊗) is a CsetF form and that
[2] [Φˇ, Φ, idIˇ , τ, idCˇ ] is an NCF isomorphism (SF Theorem 4.2 uses ¯ rather than ˇ
to suggest “choice-sequence”, and uses R|T¯ rather than τ). [1] and [2] imply the as-
sumptions of Lemma D.11 when the lemma’s Γ is Γˇ , and the lemma’s [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]
is [Φˇ, Φ, idIˇ , τ, idCˇ ]. Therefore, [1] and the lemma’s (a) implies (a), [1] and the
lemma’s (b) imply (b), and the lemma’s (c) implies (c). 2
Corollary 4.9. CsqGa˜ '˙ CsetG.
Proof. The forward direction follows from Theorem 4.8. The reverse direction
holds because [1] CsetG ⊆˙ NCGa˜ since each choice-set game is no-absentminded
by SF Proposition 4.1(g), and [2] NCGa˜ '˙ CsqGa˜ by Corollary 4.7.30 2
30Categorical proofs that compose isomorphic inclusions can save pages of work. This obser-
vation is made carefully in the last paragraph of SF Section 4.2, in connection with the proof of
SF Corollary 4.3(b). That proof closely resembles the proof of Corollary 4.9 here. Other categor-
ical arguments which compose isomorphic inclusions become routine in the paragraphs discussing
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
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In the following corollary, NCGp is the subcategory for games with perfect-
information, CsqGp is the subcategory for choice-sequence games with perfect-
information, and CsetGp is the subcategory for choice-set games with perfect-
information.
Corollary 4.10. NCGp '˙ CsqGp '˙ CsetGp.
Proof. Corollaries 4.7 and 4.9 imply NCGa˜ '˙ CsqGa˜ '˙ CsetG. Thus Propo-
sitions 4.1(b) and 4.4(a) imply [1] NCGa˜p '˙ CsqGa˜p '˙ CsetGp, where NCGa˜p
is the full subcategory for games with both no-absentmindedness and perfect-
information, and CsqGa˜p is the full subcategory for choice-sequence games with
both no-absentmindedness and perfect-information. Since no-absentmindedness
is weaker than perfect-information (SF note 14), [2] NCGa˜p = NCGp and
[3] CsqGa˜p = CsqGp. The result follows from [1], [2], and [3]. 2
NCG ≃˙
C4.6
CsqG
⊂˙
C
4
.3
(b
)
⊂˙
NCGa˜ ≃˙
C4.7
CsqGa˜ ≃˙
C4.9
CsetG
⊂˙
C
4
.4
(b
)
⊂˙ ⊂˙
NCGp ≃˙
C4.10
CsqGp ≃˙
C4.10
CsetGp
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2. Some isomorphic equivalences and strict isomorphic in-
clusions among subcategories of NCG (C=Corollary).
Figure 4.2 illustrates Corollaries 4.3(b), 4.4(b), 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, and 4.10. By com-
posing various combinations of these corollaries, one can compare any of the fig-
ure’s eight subcategories with any of the other seven subcategories. The figure
shows three of these many results, namely, the strict inclusions CsqGp ⊂˙ CsqGa˜
⊂˙ CsqG and the strict inclusion CsetGp ⊂˙ CsetG.
These many comparisons promise to be useful. For a small example, Streufert
2019 (Section 7) observes that choice-set forms are less general than choice-sequence
forms to the extent that the latter can accommodate absentmindedness while the
former cannot. That observation about forms is extended to games by the compar-
isons CsetG '˙ CsqGa˜ ⊂˙ CsqG in the top right quadrant of Figure 4.2.
Appendix A. For Tree
A.1. Basics
Lemma A.1. Let (T, p) be a (functioned) tree. Then the following hold.
(a) (∀t∈T ) to 4 t.
(b) (∀t∈Tr{to}) to ≺ t.
(c) (∀t∈T ) t∈X iff (∃t∗∈T ) t≺ t∗.
(d) (∀t∈T, t∗∈T, n≥0) t= pn(t∗) implies k(t) +n= k(t∗).
(e) (∀t∈T,m|k(t)≥m≥0, n|k(t)≥n≥0) m=n iff pm(t) = pn(t).
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(f) (∀t∈T ) P (t) = {pm(t)|k(t)≥m>0}.
(g) (∀t∈Tr{to}) p(t) ∈ P (t).
(h) (∀t∈T ) |P (t)| = k(t).
(i) (∀t∈T ) |P (t)∪{t}| = k(t)+1.
(j) (∀t∈T ) t= to iff P (t) = ∅.
(k) (∀S⊆T ) ∪t∈SP (t) = {pm(t)|t∈S, k(t)≥m>0}.
(l) (∀t∈T ) P (t) is a chain.
(m) (∀t∈T ) P (t)∪{t} is a chain.
(n) Suppose S⊆T is a nonempty chain. Then minS exists.
(o) Suppose S⊆T is a nonempty chain. Then S is finite iff maxS exists.
(p) Suppose S⊆T is a finite nonempty chain. Then S is consecutive iff S =
{ t∈T |minS4 t4maxS }.
(q) (∀Z∈Z) Z 6= ∅ and to = minZ.
(r) (∀Z∈Zft) Z = P (maxZ)∪{maxZ}.
(s) (∀Z∈Zft) |Z| = k(maxZ) + 1.
(t) (∀Z∈Z) Z is consecutive.
Proof. (a). This follows immediately from [T2] and the definition of 4.
(b). This follows immediately from [T2] and the definition of ≺.
(c). Take t ∈ T . For the forward direction, suppose t ∈ X. Then by [T1]
there is t∗ ∈ Tr{to} such that t = p(t∗). Thus the definition of ≺ implies t ≺ t∗.
Conversely, suppose there is t∗ such that t ≺ t∗. Then the definition of ≺ implies
there is m ≥ 1 such that t = pm(t∗). Hence [T1] implies t ∈ X.
(d). Suppose such t, t∗, and n satisfy [1] t = pn(t∗). By the definition of k(t),
[2] to = pk(t)(t). By substitution, [1] and [2] imply to = pk(t)+n(t∗). Thus the
definition of k(t∗) implies k(t∗) = k(t)+n.
(e). Consider such t, m, and n. The forward direction is immediate. For the
contrapositive of the reverse direction, assume m 6= n. Without loss of generality,
assume m > n. Then pm(t) = pm−n(pn(t)). Thus the definition of ≺ implies
pm(t) ≺ pn(t). Thus pm(t) 6= pn(t) (by SP Lemma A.1(b)).
(f). Take t ∈ T . By definition, P (t) = {t[∈T |t[≺t}. Thus the result is equivalent
to the statement that (∀t[∈T ) t[ ≺ t iff (∃m|k(t)≥m>0) t[ = pm(t). The reverse
direction follows from the definition of ≺. For the forward direction, suppose t[ ≺ t.
Then the definition of ≺ implies there is m ≥ 1 such that [1] t[ = pm(t). Hence it
remains to show that k(t) ≥ m. Toward that end, suppose [2] m > k(t). Then [1]
implies pm(t) exists, which by [2] implies pk(t)+1(t) exists, which by the definition
of k(t) implies p(to) exists, which contradicts claim [ii] in the second paragraph of
SP Section 2.1.
(g). Take t ∈ Tr{to}. Since t 6= to, k(t) 6= 0. Thus p(t) ∈ P (t) by part (f).
(h). This follows from part (e) and (f).
(i). This follows from part (h) and the fact that t /∈ P (t) by inspection.
(j). Take t ∈ T . In steps, t = to by the definition of k is equivalent to k(t) = 0,
which by part (h) is equivalent to P (t) = ∅.
(k). Take S ⊆ T . In steps, ∪t∈SP (t) by (f) is equal to ∪t∈S{pm(t)|k(t)≥m>0},
which by manipulation is equal to {pm(t)|t∈S, k(t)≥m>0}.
(l). Take t ∈ T , t1 ∈ P (t), and t2 ∈ P (t). Since part (f) implies P (t) = {pm(t)|
k(t)≥m>0}, there are m1 and m2 such that [1] t1 = pm1(t) and [2] t2 = pm2(t).
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Without loss of generality, assume [3] m1 ≥ m2. Then pm1(t) = pm1−m2◦pm2(t).
Thus, [1] and [2] imply t1 = pm
1−m2(t2). Thus, [3] and the definition of 4 imply
t1 4 t2.
(m). Take t ∈ T . Since P (t) is a chain by part (l), it suffices to show that
(∀t[∈P (t)) t[ ≺ t. This follows immediately from the definition of P .
(n). Take t1 ∈ S. By part (h), P (t1) is finite. Thus [1] t∗ = minP (t1)∩S exists.
It suffices to show that (∀t2∈S) t∗ 4 t2. Toward that end, take t2 ∈ S. Then since
S is a chain and t1 is also in S, either [A] t2 ≺ t1 or [B] t1 4 t2. Suppose [A]. Then
t2 ∈ P (t1)∩S, which by [1] implies t∗ 4 t2. Suppose [B]. Then [1] implies t∗ 4 t1.
This and [B] imply t∗ 4 t2.
(o). The forward direction is immediate. For the reverse direction, suppose t∗∗ =
maxS. Then S ⊆ P (t∗∗)∪{t∗∗}. This superset is finite by part (i).
(p). Since S is finite and nonempty, parts (n) and (o) imply minS and maxS
exist. For the forward direction of the equivalence, suppose [1] S is consecutive.
Then the ⊆ half of the equality follows from the definitions of min and max. For the
⊇ half of the equality, take any t such that minS 4 t 4 maxS. On the one hand,
if t equals minS or maxS, the definitions of min and max imply t ∈ S. On the
other hand, if minS ≺ t ≺ maxS, then [1] implies t ∈ S. For the reverse direction,
suppose [2] S = { t∈T |minS4 t4maxS }. Then suppose [3] s1 ∈ S, [4] s2 ∈ S,
and t ∈ T satisfy s1 ≺ t ≺ s2. This, [3], and [4] imply minS ≺ t ≺ maxS. Hence
[2] implies t ∈ S.
(q). Take Z ∈ Z. Since Z ⊆ T , part (a) implies [1] (∀t∈Z) to 4 t. Thus since
Z is a chain, {to}∪Z is a chain. Thus since Z is a maximal chain, [2] to ∈ Z. [2]
implies Z 6= ∅. Further, [2] and [1] imply to = minZ.
(r). Take Z ∈ Zft. To set up, note part (q) implies Z 6= ∅. Thus the finiteness
of Z and part (o) imply maxZ exists.
To show ⊆, take [1] t∗ ∈ Z and suppose [2] t∗ /∈ P (maxZ)∪{maxZ}. [2] implies
[3] t∗ 64 maxZ. Yet, because Z is a chain and maxZ ∈ Z, [1] and [3] implies
t∗  maxZ. This contradicts [1].
To show ⊇, consider P (maxZ)∪{maxZ}. Since maxZ ∈ Z, it suffices to show
P (maxZ) ⊆ Z. Toward that end, take t∗ ∈ P (maxZ). Then part (f) implies there
is m such that k(maxZ) ≥ m > 0 and t∗ = pm(maxZ). Thus SP Lemma A.1(h)
at t = maxZ implies t∗ ∈ Z.
(s). Take Z ∈ Zft. Part (r) implies that |Z| equals |P (maxZ)∪{maxZ}|, which
by part (i) equals k(maxZ)+1.
(t). Take Z ∈ Z. Then take t1 ∈ Z, t2 ∈ Z, and t ∈ T such that t1 ≺ t ≺ t2.
The definition of ≺ and t ≺ t2 implies there is m ≥ 1 such that t = pm(t2). Thus
SP Lemma A.1(h) implies t ∈ Z. (The existence of t1 is superfluous.) 2
Lemma A.2. Suppose (T, p) is a (functioned) tree. Define
WTr{to} = ∪v¯≥1{ (tv)v¯v=1∈T v¯ | to=p(t1), (∀v|2≤v≤v¯) tv−1=p(tv) }.
Also define w:Tr{to}→WTr{to} by w(t) = (pk(t)−v(t))k(t)v=1. Then (a) w is a well-
defined bijection, and (b) its inverse is
Tr{to} 3 tv¯ 7 →(tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTr{to}.
Proof. Call the purported inverse f . It suffices to show that [1] (∀t∈Tr{to})
f◦w(t) = t and [2] (∀(tv)v¯v=1∈WTr{to}) w◦f((tv)v¯v=1) = (tv)v¯v=1.
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For [1], take t ∈ Tr{to}. First, it must be shown that w(t) ∈ WTr{to}. By the
definition of w, it suffices to show to = p(pk(t)−1) and (∀v|2≤v≤v¯) pk(t)−(v−1)(t) =
p(pk(t)−v(t)). The former holds by the definition of k, the latter holds by ma-
nipulation. Second, it must be shown that f◦w(t) = t. In steps, f◦w(t) by the
definition of w is equal to f((pk(t)−v(t))k(t)v=1), which by the definition of f is equal
to pk(t)−v(t)|v=k(t), which is equal to t.
For [2], take (tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTr{to}. Note membership inWTr{to} implies [a] v¯ ≥ 1,
[b] to = pv¯(tv¯) and [c] (∀v|1≤v≤v¯) tv = pv¯−v(tv¯). Also note [b] and the definition
of k imply [d] k(tv¯) = v¯. Also note the definition of f implies [e] f((tv)v¯v=1) = t
v¯.
First, it must be shown that f((tv)v¯v=1) ∈ Tr{to}. [d] and [a] imply k(tv¯) ≥ 1.
Thus the definition of k implies tv¯ ∈ Tr{to}. Thus [e] implies f((tv)v¯v=1) ∈ Tr{to}.
Second, it must be shown that w◦f((tv)v¯v=1) = (tv)v¯v=1. In steps, w◦f((tv)v¯v=1) by
[e] equals w(tv¯), which by the definition of w equals (pk(t
v¯)−v(tv¯))k(t
v¯)
v=1 , which by
[d] equals (pv¯−v(tv¯))v¯v=1, which by [c] equals (t
v)v¯v=1. 2
Lemma A.3. Suppose (T, p) is a (functioned) tree. Define
WTrX = ∪v¯≥1{ (tv)v¯v=1∈T v¯ | to=p(t1), (∀v|2≤v≤v¯) tv−1=p(tv), tv¯ /∈X }.
Also define Eft:Zft→WTrX by Eft(Z) = (tv)|Z|−1v=1 , where each tv is the unique t ∈ Z
such that k(t) = v. Then (a) Eft is a well-defined bijection, and (b) its inverse is
Zft 3 {to}∪{tv|1≤v≤v¯} 7 →(tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTrX .
Proof. SP Proposition 2.2(a) implies that the following is a well-defined inverse
pair:
Zft 3 Z 7→ maxZ ∈ TrX and
Zft 3 {pm(t)|k(t)≥m≥0} 7 →t ∈ TrX.
Also, note that TrX ⊆ Tr{to} because to ∈ X by claim [iv] in the paragraph
following SP equation (1). Thus Lemma A.2’s function w can be restricted to TrX.
Hence, by inspection, Lemma A.2 implies that the following is a well-defined inverse
pair:
TrX 3 t 7→ (pk(t)−v(t))k(t)v=1 ∈ WTrX and
TrX 3 tv¯ 7 →(tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTrX .
Composing these two inverse pairs implies that the following is a well-defined inverse
pair:
Zft 3 Z 7→ (pk(maxZ)−v(maxZ))k(maxZ)v=1 ∈ WTrX and(1)
Zft 3 {pm(tv¯)|k(tv¯)≥m≥0} 7 →(tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTrX .(2)
For the lemma’s part (a), it suffices to prove that (1) coincides with Eft. By
inspection, the domain and codomain of (1) coincide with the domain and codomain
of Eft. Thus it suffices to show that
(∀Z∈Zft) (pk(maxZ)−v(maxZ))k(maxZ)v=1 = (tv)|Z|−1v=1 ,
where each tv is defined as the unique stage-v element of Z (the well-definition of
(tv)
|Z|−1
v=1 is not yet assured). Toward that end, take Z ∈ Zft. Since k(maxZ) =
|Z|−1 by Lemma A.1(s), it suffices to show that
(∀v|1≤v≤|Z|−1) p|Z|−1−v(maxZ) is the unique stage-v element of Z.
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Toward that end, take v such that 1 ≤ v ≤ |Z|−1. Since Z is a chain by definition,
and since distinct nodes in a chain have distinct stages by SP Lemma A.1(a),
it suffices to show that k(p|Z|−1−v(maxZ)) = v. In steps, k(p|Z|−1−v(maxZ))
by Lemma A.1(d) equals k(maxZ) − (|Z|−1−v), which by Lemma A.1(s) equals
(|Z|−1)− (|Z|−1−v), which equals v.
For the lemma’s part (b), it suffices to prove that (2) coincides with the lemma’s
purported inverse. By inspection, the domains and codomains coincide. Thus it
suffices to show that
(∀(tv)v¯v=1∈WTrX) {pm(tv¯)|k(tv¯)≥m≥0} = {to}∪{tv|1≤v≤v¯}.
Toward that end, take (tv)v¯v=1 ∈ WTrX . Membership in WTrX implies [a] v¯ ≥ 1,
[b] to = pv¯(vv¯) and [c] (∀v|1≤v≤v¯) tv = pv¯−v(tv¯). Also, [b] and the definition of k
imply [d] k(tv¯) = v¯. It will be argued that
{pm(tv¯)|k(tv¯)≥m≥0}
= {pm(tv¯)|v¯≥m≥0}
= {pv¯(tv¯)} ∪ {pm(tv¯)|v¯−1≥m≥0}
= {pv¯(tv¯)} ∪ {pv¯−v(tv¯)|v¯−1≥v¯−v≥0}
= {pv¯(tv¯)} ∪ {pv¯−v(tv¯)|1≤v≤v¯}
= {to} ∪ {tv|1≤v≤v¯} .
The first equality holds by [d], the second holds by [a], and the third holds by
changing the variable m to v¯−v. The fourth holds because v¯−1≥v¯−v≥0 is equiva-
lent to −1≥−v≥−v¯, which is equivalent to 1≤v≤v¯. The fifth holds by [b] and [c].
2
A.2. Subtrees
Lemma A.4. Let (T, p) be a subtree of (T ′, p′). Then the following hold.
(a) Tr{to} ⊆ T ′r{t′o}.
(b) p = p′|sjTr{to}.
(c) X = X ′∩T .
(d) to ∈ X ′.
(e) TrX ⊆ T ′rX ′.
Proof. (a). Take [1] t ∈ Tr{to}. By tree inclusion, T ⊆ T ′. Thus, [2] to ∈ T ′,
and also, [1] implies [3] t ∈ T ′. Further, [1] and the subtree condition T = {t′∈T ′|
to4′t′} imply [4] to ≺′ t. Note [2] and Lemma A.1(a) imply [5] t′o 4′ to. [4] and
[5] imply t′o ≺′ t. This and [3] imply t ∈ T ′r{t′o}.
(b). [T1] for (T, p) implies that p has domain Tr{to} and is surjective. Thus
it suffices to show that pgr ⊆ p′ gr. This follows from [t2] for the tree inclusion
[(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ].
(c). For the ⊆ direction, it suffices to show X ⊆ X ′. It is argued, in steps,
that X by [T1] for (T, p) is equal to the range of p, which by part (b) is included
in the range of p′, which by [T2] for (T ′, p′) is equal to X ′. For the ⊇ direction,
take t ∈ X ′∩T . Since t ∈ X ′, there exists t′] ∈ T ′ such that [1] t = p′(t′]). Since
t ∈ T , the subtree condition T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} implies [2] to 4′ t. Since [1] implies
t ≺′ t′], [2] implies to ≺′ t′]. Thus the subtree condition T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} implies
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t′] ∈ Tr{to}. This, [1], and part (b) imply t = p(t′]). This and [T1] for (T, p)
imply t ∈ X.
(d). Remark [iv] in the paragraph after SP equation (1) implies to ∈ X. Hence
part (c) implies to ∈ X ′.
(e). It is argued, in steps, that TrX by (c) equals Tr(X ′∩T ), which by inspec-
tion equals TrX ′, which by T ⊆T ′ is a subset of T ′rX ′. 2
Lemma A.5. Suppose (T, p) and (T ′, p′) are trees. Then (T, p) is a subtree of
(T ′, p′) iff T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} and p = p′|sjTr{to}.
Proof. Suppose (T, p) is a subtree of (T ′, p′). The first condition holds by the
definition of subtree inclusion. The second holds by Lemma A.4(b).
Conversely, suppose [1] T = {t′∈T ′|to4t′} and [2] p = p′|sjTr{to}. By the def-
inition of subtree, it suffices to show that [(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is a morphism
satisfying T = {t′∈T ′|to4t′}. Thus, by [1], it remains to show that the triple
[(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is a morphism. It will be argued that the triple satisfies [t1]
and [t2]. For [t1], note [1] implies T ⊆ T ′ and thus incT,T ′ :T→T ′ is well-defined.
For [t2], it suffices to show that pgr ⊆ p′ gr. This holds by [2]. 2
Lemma A.6. Suppose (T ′, p′) is a tree and t? ∈ X ′. Define T = {t′∈T ′|t?4′t′}
and p = p′|sjTr{t?}. Then (T, p) is a well-defined subtree of (T ′, p′), and to = t?.
Proof. The lemma follows from Claims 3 and 4.
Claim 1: Tr{t?} 6= ∅. Since t? ∈ X ′, Lemma A.1(c) implies there is [1] t′ ∈ T ′
such that [2] t? ≺ t′. [1], [2], and the definition of T imply t′ ∈ T . [2] implies
t′ 6= t?.
Claim 2: Tr{t?} ⊆ T ′r{t′o}. Take t ∈ Tr{t?}. Thus the definition of T im-
plies [1] t ∈ T ′ and [2] t? ≺′ t. Meanwhile, the assumption t? ∈ X ′ implies t? ∈ T ′,
and thus Lemma A.1(a) implies [3] t′o 4′ t?. [2] and [3] imply t′o ≺′ t. This and
[1] imply t ∈ T ′r{t′o}.
Claim 3: (a) (T, p) is a well-defined tree, and (b) to = t?. Note that p is surjec-
tive by construction. Thus it suffices to show
[T1?] p is a nonempty function with domain Tr{t?}, and
[T2?] (∀t∈Tr{t?})(∃m≥1) pm(t) = t?.
First consider [T1?]. [T1] for (T ′, p′) states that p′ is a function from T ′r{t′o}.
This and Claim 2 imply that p = p′|sjTr{t?} is a well-defined function from Tr{t?}.
Further, Claim 1 implies that this function is nonempty.
Second consider [T2?]. Take t ∈ Tr{t?}. This and the definition of T imply
t? ≺′ t, which by the definition of ≺′ implies there is m ≥ 1 such that [1] t? =
(p′)m(t). Note that (∀n|m>n≥0) t? = (p′)m−n◦(p′)n(t). This and the defini-
tion of ≺′ imply (∀n|m>n≥0) t? ≺ (p′)n(t). This and the definition of T imply
(∀n|m>n≥0) (p′)n(t) ∈ Tr{t?}. This and the definition of p implies [2] (p′)m(t) =
pm(t). [1] and [2] imply t? = pm(t).
Claim 4: (T, p) is a subtree of (T ′, p′). This follows from the reverse direction
of Lemma A.5. In particular, the lemma’s assumptions hold because (T, p) is a
tree by Claim 3(a) and because (T ′, p′) is a tree by assumption. The lemma’s two
conditions are identical to the definitions of T and p. 2
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A.3. How Tree morphisms interact with plays
Lemma A.7. Suppose θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a tree morphism with its Zθ.
Then the following hold.
(a) If S⊆T is a consecutive chain, then τ¯(S) is a consecutive chain.
(b) If S⊆T is a nonempty chain, then τ(minS) = min τ¯(S).
(c) If S⊆T is a finite nonempty chain, then τ(maxS) = max τ¯(S).
(d) (∀Z∈Z) τ¯(Z) is a consecutive chain.
(e) (∀Z∈Z) min τ¯(Z) = τ(to).
(f) (∀Z∈Z) P ′(min τ¯(Z)) = P ′◦τ(to).
(g) (∀Z∈Zft) max τ¯(Z) = τ(maxZ).
(h) (∀Z∈Zft) Z ∈ Zθ iff τ(maxZ) /∈ X ′.
(i) Zθ = Zinft ∪ {Z∈Zft | τ(maxZ) /∈X ′ }.
(j) Zθ = Z iff τ¯(TrX) ⊆ T ′rX ′.
(k) (∀Z∈Zinft) P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)∈Z ′inft.
(l) (∀Z∈Zft) P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) = P ′(max τ¯(Z))∪{max τ¯(Z)}.
(m) (∀Z∈Zft) P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) is finite.
(n) (∀Z∈Zft) Z ∈Zθ iff P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)∈Z ′.
(o) Zθ = {Z∈Z |P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)∈Z ′ }.
Proof. (a). Suppose S is a consecutive chain. SP Proposition 2.4(f) implies that
τ¯(S) is a chain. Thus it remains to show that τ¯(S) is consecutive. Toward that
end, take [a] t′A ∈ τ¯(S), [b] t′B ∈ τ¯(S), and t′ ∈ T ′ such that [c] t′A ≺ t′ ≺ t′B . [a]
implies there is [d] tA ∈ S such that [e] t′A = τ(tA). [b] implies there is [f] tB ∈ S
such that [g] t′B = τ(tB). Finally, [c] implies there are [h] m ≥ 1 and [i] n ≥ 1 such
that [j] t′A = (p′)m(t′) and [k] t′ = (p′)n(t′B).
By substitution, [j] and [k] imply [1] t′A = (p′)m+n(t′B). Thus Lemma A.1(d)
implies [2] m + n = k(tB) − k(tA). By substitution, [k] and [g] imply [3] t′ =
(p′)n(τ(tB)). Since n ≤ k(tB) by [2], SP Proposition 2.4(b) implies (p′)n(τ(tB)) =
τ(pn(tB)). This and [3] imply [4] t′ = τ(pn(tB)).
By substitution, [1], [e], and [g] imply [5] τ(tA) = (p′)m+n(τ(tB)). Since
m+n ≤ k(tB) by [2], SP Proposition 2.4(b) implies (p′)m+n(τ(tB)) = τ(pm+n(tB)).
This and [5] imply [6] τ(tA) = τ(pm+n(tB)). Because τ |S is injective by SP Propo-
sition 2.4(f), [6] implies [7] tA = pm+n(tB).
Finally, [7], [h], and [i] imply tA ≺ pn(tB) ≺ tB . This, [d], [f], and the assumed
consecutiveness of S imply that pn(tB) ∈ S. This and [4] imply t′ ∈ τ¯(S).
(b). Suppose S is a nonempty chain. Lemma A.1(n) implies minS exists. Simi-
larly, SP Proposition 2.4(f) implies τ¯(S) is a chain, which by Lemma A.1(n) implies
min τ¯(S) exists. Thus it remains to show the relationship between these two min-
ima.
To begin, (∀t∈S) minS 4 t, which by SP Proposition 2.4(e) implies (∀t∈S)
τ(minS) 4′ τ(t), which implies [1] τ(minS) 4′ min τ¯(S). Conversely, minS ∈ S,
which implies τ(minS) ∈ τ¯(S), which implies [2] τ(minS) <′ min τ¯(S). [1] and [2]
imply τ(minS) = min τ¯(S)
(c). Suppose S is a finite nonempty chain. Lemma A.1(o) implies maxS exists.
Inspection shows τ¯(S) is finite and nonempty, and SP Proposition 2.4(f) shows τ¯(S)
is a chain. Thus Lemma A.1(o) implies max τ¯(S) exists. It remains to show the
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relationship between these two maxima. This is done as in the second paragraph
of the proof of part (b).
(d). This follows from part (a) and Lemma A.1(t).
(e). Take Z ∈ Z. In steps, min τ¯(S) by part (b) is equal to τ(minZ), which by
Lemma A.1(q) is equal to τ(to).
(f). This follows immediately from part (e).
(g). Take Z ∈ Zft. Lemma A.1(q) implies Z is nonempty. Thus part (c) implies
τ(maxZ) = max τ¯(Z).
(h). Take Z ∈ Zft. In steps, Z ∈ Zθ by the definition of Zθ is equivalent to
(/∃t′∈T ′) τ(maxZ)≺′t′, which by Lemma A.1(c) is equivalent to τ(maxZ) /∈X ′.
(i). By definition, Zθ includes Zinft. Thus part (i) follows from (h).
(j). In steps, Zθ = Z by part (i) is equivalent to (/∃Z∈Zft) τ(maxZ) ∈ X ′,
which by SP Proposition 2.2(a) is equivalent to (/∃t∈TrX) τ(t) ∈ X ′, which by
[t1] is equivalent to τ(TrX) ⊆ T ′rX ′.
(k). Take [a] Z ∈ Zinft. SP Proposition 2.4(f) implies τ¯(Z) ⊆ T ′ is an infinite
chain. Thus SP Lemma A.1(f) implies τ¯(Z)∪{(p′)m(t′)|t′∈τ¯(Z), k′(t′)≥m>0} ∈
Z ′inft. Hence it suffices to show that
τ¯(Z)∪{(p′)m(t′)|t′∈τ¯(Z), k′(t′)≥m>0} = P ′◦τ(to)∪ τ¯(Z).
For the ⊇ direction, it suffices to show that P ′◦τ(to) is included in the left-hand
side. Note part (e) implies [b] τ(to) ∈ τ¯(Z). It is then argued that P ′◦τ(to) by
Lemma A.1(f) is equal to {(p′)m(τ(to))|k′(τ(to))≥t′>0}, which by [b] is a subset of
{(p′)m(t′)|t′∈τ¯(Z), k′(t′)≥m>0}.
For the ⊆ direction, it suffices to show that {(p′)m(t′)|t′∈τ¯(Z), k′(t′)≥m>0} is
included in the right-hand side. Toward that end, take [c] t′ ∈ τ¯(Z) and m such
that [d] k′(t′) ≥ m > 0. [c] implies there is [e] t ∈ Z such that [f] t′ = τ(t).
Note [g] k′(t′) = k′◦τ(to) + k(t), because k′(t′) by [f] equals k′◦τ(t) which by SP
Proposition 2.4(c) equals k′◦τ(to) + k(t). [d] and [g] imply either [1] k′(t′) ≥ m >
k(t) or [2] k(t) ≥ m > 0.
First assume [1]. Note [h] (p′)m(t′) = (p′)m−k(t)(τ(to)), because (p′)m(t′) by
[f] equals (p′)m(τ(t)), which by [1] equals (p′)m−k(t)((p′)k(t)(τ(t))), which by SP
Proposition 2.4(b) equals (p′)m−k(t)(τ(pk(t)(t))), which by the definition of k equals
(p′)m−k(t)(τ(to)). [h] and [1] imply (p′)m(t′) ∈ P ′◦τ(to).
Second assume [2]. Note [i] (p′)m(t′) = τ(pm(t)), because (p′)m(t′) by [f] equals
(p′)m(τ(t)), which by SP Proposition 2.4(b) and [2] equals τ(pm(t)). SP Lemma
A.1(h), [a], [e], and [2] imply pm(t) ∈ Z. Thus [i] implies (p′)m(t′) ∈ τ¯(Z).
(l). Take Z ∈ Zft. Lemma A.1(q) shows Z is nonempty. Thus part (d) im-
plies that τ¯(Z) is a consecutive finite nonempty chain. Thus Lemma A.1(p) im-
plies [a] τ¯(Z) = { t′∈T ′ |min τ¯(Z)4 t′4max τ¯(Z) }. Meanwhile, part (f) implies
[b] P ′◦τ(to) = { t′∈T ′ | t′≺′min τ¯(Z) }. [a] and [b] imply P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) =
{ t′∈T ′ | t′4′max τ¯(Z) }.
(m). This follows from part (l) and Lemma A.1(i).
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(n). Take Z ∈ Zft. Consider the following statements.
[1] Z ∈ Zθ.
[2] (/∃t′+∈T ′) τ(maxZ)≺′ t′+.
[3] (/∃t′+∈T ′) max τ¯(Z)≺′ t′+.
[4] P ′(max τ¯(Z))∪{max τ¯(Z)} ∈ Z ′.
[5] P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′.
[1]⇔[2] by the definition of Zθ. [2]⇔[3] by part (g). To show the contraposi-
tive of [3]⇒[4], suppose [4] is violated. Then since P ′(max τ¯(Z))∪{max τ¯(Z)} is
a chain by Lemma A.1(m), this chain fails to be maximal. Thus [3] is violated.
To show the contrapositive of [3]⇐[4], suppose [3] is violated. Then, by inspec-
tion, P ′(max τ¯(Z))∪{max τ¯(Z)} cannot be a maximal chain. Thus [4] is violated.
Finally [4]⇔[5] by part (l).
(o). For ⊆, suppose Z ∈ Zθ. On the one hand, if Z ∈ Zinft, part (k) im-
plies P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. On the other hand, if Z ∈ Zft, the forward direction
of part (n) implies P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. For ⊇, suppose Z ∈ Z is such that
P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. On the one hand, if Z ∈ Zinft, the definition of Zθ implies
Z ∈ Zθ. On the other hand, if Z ∈ Zft, the reverse direction of part (n) implies
Z ∈ Zθ. 2
Proof A.8 (for Proposition 2.3). (a). Suppose (T, p) has only infinite plays,
that is, suppose [1] Z = Zinft. The definition of Zθ implies [2] Zinft ⊆ Zθ ⊆ Z. [1]
and [2] imply Zθ = Z.
(b). Suppose θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is a subtree inclusion. Then Lemma
A.4(e) implies TrX ⊆ T ′rX ′. Thus incT,T ′(TrX) ⊆ T ′rX ′. Thus the reverse
direction of Lemma A.7(j) implies Zθ = Z.
(c). Suppose θ is an isomorphism.
[1]. SP Theorem 2.6 implies τ is a bijection from T onto T ′, and SP Proposi-
tion 2.7(a) implies τ |sjX is a bijection from X onto X ′. Thus τ |sjTrX is a bijection
from TrX onto T ′rX ′, which implies a fortiori that τ¯(TrX) ⊆ T ′rX ′. Thus
the reverse direction of Lemma A.7(j) implies Zθ = Z. [2]. SP Proposition 2.7(c)
implies τ(to) = t′o. Thus Lemma A.1(j) implies P ′◦τ(to) = ∅. 2
Lemma A.9. Let [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′] be morphisms.
Then k′′◦τ ′◦τ(to) = k′′◦τ ′(t′o) + k′◦τ(to).
Proof. By the definition of k′′, it suffices to argue
t′′o = [p′′]k
′′◦τ ′(t′o)( τ ′(t′o) )
= [p′′]k
′′◦τ ′(t′o)( τ ′( [p′]k
′◦τ(to)( τ(to) ) ) )
= [p′′]k
′′◦τ ′(t′o)( [p′′]k
′◦τ(to)( τ ′◦τ(to) ) )
= [p′′]k
′′◦τ ′(t′o)+k′◦τ(to)( τ ′◦τ(to) ).
The first equality holds by the definition of k′′, the second by the definition of k′,
the third by SP Proposition 2.4(b), and the fourth by rearrangement. 2
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Lemma A.10. Suppose [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′] are mor-
phisms. Then (∀Z∈Z) P ′′◦τ ′◦τ(to) ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z) = P ′′◦τ ′(t′o) ∪ τ¯ ′(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)).
Proof. Take Z ∈ Z. First, it is argued that
P ′′◦τ ′(t′o)(i)
= { [p′′]m′′( τ ′(t′o) ) | k′′◦τ ′(t′o)≥m′′>0 }
= { [p′′]m′′( τ ′( [p′]k′◦τ(to)( τ(to) ) ) ) | k′′◦τ ′(t′o)≥m′′>0 }
= { [p′′]m′′( [p′′]k′◦τ(to)( τ ′◦τ(to) ) ) | k′′◦τ ′(t′o)≥m′′>0 }
= { [p′′]m′′+k′◦τ(to)( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′′◦τ ′(t′o)≥m′′>0 }
= { [p′′]m∗( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′′◦τ ′(t′o)+k′◦τ(to)≥m∗>k′◦τ(to) }
= { [p′′]m∗( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)≥m∗>k′◦τ(to) },
where the first equality holds by Lemma A.1(f), the second by the definition of
k′, the third by SP Proposition 2.4(b), the fourth by rearrangement, the fifth by
replacing m′′ with m∗−k′◦τ(to), and the sixth by Lemma A.9. Second, it is argued
that
τ¯ ′(P ′◦τ(to))(ii)
= τ¯ ′({ [p′]m′( τ(to) ) | k′◦τ(to)≥m′>0 })
= { τ ′( [p′]m′( τ(to) ) ) | k′◦τ(to)≥m′>0 }
= { [p′′]m′( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′◦τ(to)≥m′>0 },
where the first equality holds by Lemma A.1(f), the second by rearrangement, and
the third by SP Proposition 2.4(b). Finally, I argue
P ′′◦τ ′(t′o) ∪ τ¯ ′(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z))
= P ′′◦τ ′(t′o) ∪ τ¯ ′(P ′◦τ(to)) ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)
= { [p′′]m∗( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)≥m∗>k′◦τ(to) }
∪ { [p′′]m′( τ ′◦τ(to) ) | k′◦τ(to)≥m′>0 } ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)
= { [p′′]m′′◦τ ′◦τ(to) | k′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)≥m′′>0 } ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)
= P ′′◦τ ′◦τ(to) ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z),
where the first equality holds by rearrangement, the second by (i) and (ii), the third
by rearrangement, and the fourth by Lemma A.1(f). 2
Lemma A.11. Suppose θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and θ′ = [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′] are
morphisms. Then the following hold.
(a) Zθ′◦θ ⊆ Zθ.
(b) If Z ′ θ′ = Z ′, then Zθ′◦θ = Zθ.
(c) {P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)|Z∈Zθ′◦θ} ⊆ Z ′ θ′ .
Proof. (a). Take [1] Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ. On the one hand, suppose Z ∈ Zinft. Then
Z ∈ Zθ by the definition of Zθ. On the other hand, suppose Z ∈ Zft. Then [1] and
the forward direction of Lemma A.7(h) imply [2] τ ′◦τ(maxZ) /∈ X ′′. Meanwhile,
the second half of SP Proposition 2.3(9a) implies (∀t′∈T ′) t′∈X ′ ⇒ τ ′(t′)∈X ′′. The
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contrapositive is [3] (∀t′∈T ′) τ ′(t′)/∈X ′′ ⇒ t′ /∈X ′. [2] and [3] at t′=τ(maxZ) imply
τ(maxZ)/∈X ′. Hence the reverse direction of Lemma A.7(h) implies Z ∈ Zθ.
(b). Suppose [1] Z ′ θ′ = Z ′. The ⊆ direction holds by part (a) (independently
of [1]). For the ⊇ direction, take [2] Z ∈ Zθ. On the one hand, suppose Z ∈ Zinft.
Then Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ by the definition of Zθ′◦θ. On the other hand, suppose Z ∈ Zft.
Then [2] and the forward direction of Lemma A.7(h) imply [3] τ(maxZ) ∈ T ′rX ′.
Meanwhile, [1] and Lemma A.7(j) imply [4] τ¯ ′(T ′rX ′) ⊆ T ′′rX ′′. [3] and [4]
imply τ ′◦τ(maxZ) ∈ T ′′rX ′′. Thus the reverse direction of Lemma A.7(h) implies
Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ.
(c). Take [1] Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ.
On the one hand, suppose [A] Z ∈ Zinft. Then Lemma A.7(k) implies
P ′◦τ(to)∪Z ∈ Z ′inft. Thus the definition of Z ′ θ
′
implies P ′◦τ(to)∪Z ∈ Z ′ θ′ . (This
argument follows from [A] independently of [1].)
On the other hand, suppose [B] Z ∈ Zft. [1] and part (a) imply Z ∈ Zθ. Thus
Lemma A.7(o) implies P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′. Thus [B] and Lemma A.7(m) imply
[2] P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′ft.
Further, [1], [B], and the forward direction of Lemma A.7(h) imply
[3] τ ′◦τ(maxZ) /∈ X ′′. Also,
[4] maxP ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) = max τ¯(Z) = τ(maxZ),
where the first equality holds by [B] and Lemma A.7(l) and the second holds by
[B] and Lemma A.7(g). Thus
[5] τ ′(maxP ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)) = τ ′◦τ(maxZ) /∈ X ′′,
where the first equality holds by applying τ ′ to both sides of [4], and where the
second holds by [3].
Finally, the reverse direction of Lemma A.7(h) implies that
(∀Z ′∈Z ′ft) τ ′(maxZ ′) /∈X ′′ ⇒ Z ′ ∈Z ′ θ
′
.
Consider this statement at Z ′ = P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z). This, [2], and [5] imply
P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′ θ′ . 2
Appendix B. For NCP
Lemma B.1. Suppose Π is an NCP preform. Then (∀S∈S) (∃!Z∈Z)
(∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t)∈S.
Proof. Take S ∈ S.
Claim 1: Define ε:X→T at each t ∈ X by ε(t) = t⊗c, where c is the unique
element of S∩F (t). Then (a) ε is well-defined. Also (b) (∀t∈X) p(ε(t)) = t. Also
(c) (∀t∈X) q(ε(t)) ∈ S.
(a). Take t ∈ X. [P3] implies there is H ∈ H such that t ∈ H. Hence SP
Proposition 3.2(16a) implies F¯ (H) = F (t). Also, the definition of S implies
|S∩F¯ (H)| = 1. The last two sentences imply |S∩F (t)| = 1. Thus c is well-defined
as the set’s unique element. Finally, note c ∈ F (t) implies (t, c) ∈ F gr. Thus t⊗c
is well-defined by [P1]. (b) and (c). Take t ∈ X. By definition, ε(t) = t⊗c,
where c is the unique element of S∩F (t). Hence p(ε(t)) = p(t⊗c) = t and
q(ε(t)) = q(t⊗c) = c ∈ S, where in both cases, the second equality holds by SP
Proposition 3.1(b).
Claim 2: Recursively define V˙ ⊆ N1 and (t˙v)v∈V˙ as follows. [1] Let t˙1 = ε(to).
If t˙1 /∈ X, let V˙ = {1} and terminate. Else, [2] let t˙2 = ε(t˙1). If t˙2 /∈ X, let
32 B. For NCP
V˙ = {1, 2} and terminate. Else, [3] let t˙3 = ε(t˙2). If t˙3 /∈ X, let V˙ = {1, 2, 3} and
terminate. ... If the recursion does not terminate (that is, if (∀v∈N1) t˙v ∈ X),
let V˙ = N1. Then (a) V˙ and (t˙v)v∈V˙ are well-defined. Also (b) to = p(t˙1) and
(∀v∈V˙r{1}) t˙v−1 = p(t˙v). Also (c) (∀v∈V˙ ) q(t˙v) ∈ S.
(a). By claim [iv] in the paragraph after SP equation (1), to ∈ X. Thus
Claim 1(a) implies t˙1 is well-defined. For each v ≥ 2, step [v−1] assures t˙v−1 ∈ X
and thus Claim 1(a) implies t˙v is well-defined. Hence by inspection, V˙ and (t˙v)v∈V˙
are well-defined. (b). At v = 1, p(t˙1) by definition equals p(ε(to)), which by
Claim 1(b) equals to. At v ∈ V˙r{1}, p(t˙v) by definition equals p(ε(t˙v−1)), which
by Claim 1(b) equals t˙v−1. (c). At v = 1, q(t˙1) by definition equals q(ε(to)), which
by Claim 1(c) belongs to S. At v ∈ V˙r{1}, q(t˙v) by definition equals q(ε(t˙v−1)),
which by Claim 1(c) belongs to S.
Claim 3: Define Z˙ = {to}∪{t˙v|v∈V˙ }. Then (a) Z˙ ∈ Z and (b) (∀t∈Z˙r{to})
q(t) ∈ S.
(a). On the one hand, suppose V˙ is finite and set v¯ = max V˙ . Then the
definitions in Claim 2 imply V˙ = {1, 2, ... v¯} and t˙v¯ /∈ X. Thus Claim 2(b) im-
plies (t˙v)v∈V˙ ∈ WTrX , where WTrX is defined in Lemma A.3. Thus the reverse
direction of Lemma A.3 implies {to}∪{t˙v|v∈V˙ } ∈ Zft. Thus the definition of Z˙
implies Z˙ ∈ Z. On the other hand, suppose V˙ is infinite. Then the definitions in
Claim 2 imply V˙ = N1. Thus Claim 2(b) implies (t˙v)v∈V˙ ∈ Y, where Y is defined
in SP Proposition 2.2(b). Thus the reverse direction of SP Proposition 2.2(b) im-
plies {to}∪{t˙v|v∈V˙ } ∈ Zinft. Thus the definition of Z˙ implies Z˙ ∈ Z. (b). Take
t ∈ Z˙r{to}. The definition of Z˙ implies there is v ∈ V˙ such that t = t˙v. Thus
Claim 2(c) implies q(t) ∈ S.
Claim 4: Suppose Z ∈ Zft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then (a) |Z|−1 ≤
max V˙ and (b) (∀v|1≤v≤|Z|−1) Eft(Z)v = t˙v, where Eft is defined in Lemma A.3.
Note that (∀v|1≤v≤|Z|−1) Eft(Z)v ∈ Zr{to} by the definition of Eft. Thus
the claim’s assumption implies that [a] (∀v|1≤v≤|Z|−1) q(Eft(Z)v) ∈ S. Also,
note that Lemma A.3 implies Eft(Z) ∈ WTrX . Thus [b] to = p(Eft(Z)1) and
[c] (∀v|2≤v≤|Z|−1) Eft(Z)v−1 = p(Eft(Z)v).
It suffices to show that (∀v|1≤v≤|Z|−1) [1] v ≤ max V˙ and [2] Eft(Z)v = t˙v.
This will be shown by induction.
For the initial step, suppose v = 1. [1] holds easily by the definition of V˙ in
Claim 2. Further, [b] implies there is [d] c ∈ F (to) such that [e] to⊗c = Eft(Z)1.
[e] implies c = q(Eft(Z)
1) and thus [a] implies [f] c ∈ S. [d]–[f] and the definition
of ε in Claim 1 imply Eft(Z)
1 = ε(to). Thus the definition of t˙1 in Claim 2 implies
Eft(Z)
1 = t˙1. Thus [2] holds.
For the inductive step, suppose v satisfies 2 ≤ v < |Z|−1. Then [c] and the
inductive hypothesis imply [g] t˙v−1 = p(Eft(Z)v). [g] implies t˙v−1 ∈ X and thus [1]
holds by the definition of V˙ in Claim 2. Further, [g] implies there is [h] c ∈ F (t˙v−1)
such that [i] t˙v−1⊗c = Eft(Z)v. [i] implies c = q(Eft(Z)v) and thus [a] implies
[j] c ∈ S. [h]–[j] and the definition of ε in Claim 1 imply Eft(Z)v = ε(t˙v−1). Thus
the definition of t˙v in Claim 2 implies Eft(Z)
v = t˙v. Thus [2] holds.
Claim 5: Suppose Z ∈ Zft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then (a) |Z|−1 =
max V˙ and (b) Eft(Z) = (t˙
v)v∈V˙ .
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Because of Claim 4, it suffices to show that |Z|−1 = max V˙ . Lemma A.3 implies
Eft(Z) ∈ WTrX . Thus the definitions of Eft and WTrX imply (Eft(Z)v)|Z|−1v=1 ∈
∪v¯≥1{ (tv)v¯v=1∈T v¯ | tv¯ /∈X }. Hence Eft(Z)|Z|−1 /∈ X. Thus Claim 4(b) at v =
|Z|−1 implies t˙|Z|−1 /∈ X. Thus the recursive definition of (t˙v)v∈V˙ in Claim 2
terminates at stage [ |Z|−1 ]. Thus max V˙ = |Z|−1.
Claim 6: Suppose Z ∈ Zft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then Z = Z˙.
Claim 5 implies, a fortiori, that the range of Eft(Z) equals the range of (t˙
v)v∈V˙ .
In other words, [a] {Eft(Z)v|1≤v≤|Z|−1} = {t˙v|v∈V˙ }. It is then argued, in steps,
that Z by Lemma A.3 is equal to {to}∪{Eft(Z)v|1≤v≤|Z|−1}, which by [a] is equal
to {to}∪{t˙v|v∈V˙ }, which by the definition of Z˙ in Claim 3 is equal to Z˙.
Claim 7: Suppose Z ∈ Zinft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then (a) V˙ ⊇ N1
and (b) (∀v∈N1) E(Z)v = t˙v, where E is defined in SP Proposition 2.2(b).
Note that (∀v≥1) E(Z)v ∈ Zr{to} by the definition of E. Thus the claim’s
assumption implies that [a] (∀v≥1) q(E(Z)v) ∈ S. Also, note that SP Proposi-
tion 2.2(b) implies E(Z) ∈ Y, where Y is defined in SP Proposition 2.2(b). Thus
[b] to = p(E(Z)1) and [c] (∀v≥2) E(Z)v−1 = p(E(Z)v).
It suffices to show that (∀v≥1) [1] v ∈ V˙ and [2] E(Z)v = t˙v. This will be shown
by induction.
For the initial step, suppose v = 1. [1] holds easily by the definition of V˙ in
Claim 2. Further, [b] implies there is [d] c ∈ F (to) such that [e] to⊗c = E(Z)1.
[e] implies c = q(E(Z)1) and thus [a] implies [f] c ∈ S. [d]–[f] and the definition
of ε in Claim 1 imply E(Z)1 = ε(to). Thus the definition of t˙1 in Claim 2 implies
E(Z)1 = t˙1. Thus [2] holds.
For the inductive step, suppose v ≥ 2. Then [c] and the inductive hypothesis
imply [g] t˙v−1 = p(E(Z)v). [g] implies t˙v−1 ∈ X, so [1] holds by the definition of
V˙ in Claim 2. Further, [g] implies there is [h] c ∈ F (t˙v−1) such that [i] t˙v−1⊗c =
E(Z)v. [i] implies c = q(E(Z)v) and thus [a] implies [j] c ∈ S. [h]–[j] and the
definition of ε in Claim 1 imply E(Z)v = ε(t˙v−1). Thus the definition of t˙v in
Claim 2 implies E(Z)v = t˙v. Thus [2] holds.
Claim 8: Suppose Z ∈ Zinft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then (a) V˙ = N1
and (b) E(Z) = (t˙v)v∈V˙ .
Because of Claim 7(b), it suffices to show that V˙ = N1. The definition of V˙ in
Claim 2 implies V˙ ⊆ N1. Claim 7(a) shows the converse.
Claim 9: Suppose Z ∈ Zinft satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S. Then Z = Z˙.
Claim 8 implies, a fortiori, that the range of E(Z) equals the range of (t˙v)v∈V˙ .
In other words, [a] {E(Z)v|v≥1} = {t˙v|v∈V˙ }. It is then argued, in steps, that Z
by SP Proposition 2.2(b) is equal to {to}∪{E(Z)v|v≥1}, which by [a] is equal to
{to}∪{t˙v|v∈V˙ }, which by the definition of Z˙ in Claim 3 is equal to Z˙.
Conclusion. Claim 3 shows that Z˙ is a Z ∈Z that satisfies (∀t∈Zr{to}) q(t) ∈ S.
Claims 6 and 9 show that Z˙ is the only Z ∈Z that does so. 2
Lemma B.2. Suppose Π and Π ′ are NCP preforms. Then the following are
equivalent.
(a) [Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a subpreform inclusion.
(b) [(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is a subtree inclusion, C ⊆C ′, ⊗=⊗′|sjF gr , and H⊆H′.
(c) T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, C ⊆C ′, ⊗ = ⊗′|sjF gr , and H⊆H′.
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Proof. (a)⇒(b). Suppose (a). Then, by definition, [1] [Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is
an inclusion, [2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, and [3] H⊆H′. [1] and the “forgetful” functor
of SP Theorem 3.9 imply [(T, p), (T ′, p′), incT,T ′ ] is an inclusion, and thus [2] implies
it is a subtree inclusion. [1] implies C ⊆ C ′. In light of [3] and the previous two
sentences, it remains to show that ⊗ = ⊗′|sjF gr . [P1] for Π implies ⊗ has domain
F gr and is surjective. Thus it suffices to show that ⊗gr ⊆ ⊗′ gr. This follows from
[p2] for [Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ].
(b)⇒(c). Suppose (b). Then, the definition of subtree inclusion implies T =
{t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, and the remaining conditions in (b) are identical to the remaining
conditions in (c).
(a)⇐(c). Suppose (c). Then [1] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, [2] C ⊆C ′, [3] ⊗ =
⊗′|sjF gr , and [4] H⊆H′. [1] implies [5] T ⊆ T ′. By the definition of a sub-
preform inclusion, it suffices to show that [i] T ⊆ T ′, that [ii] C ⊆ C ′, and that
[iii] [Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a morphism satisfying T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} and H⊆H′.
By inspection, [i] is implied by [5], [ii] is implied by [2], and the two conditions
in [iii] are implied by [1] and [4]. Thus it remains to show that the quadruple
[Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a morphism. It will be argued that the quadruple satisfies
[p1] and [p2]. For [p1], [5] and [2] imply that incT,T ′ :T→T ′ and incC,C′ :C→C ′ are
well-defined. For [p2], it suffices to show that ⊗gr ⊆ ⊗′ gr. This holds by [3]. 2
Lemma B.3. Suppose [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism. Then the following
hold.
(a) (∀H∈H, c∈C) c∈F¯ (H) ⇔ δ(c)∈F¯ ′(τ¯(H)).
(b) (∀H∈H) δ¯◦F¯ (H) = F¯ ′(τ¯(H)).
(c) (∀H∈H) δ|F¯ (H) is a bijection from F¯ (H) onto F¯ ′(τ¯(H)).
(d) δ¯|sjS is a bijection from S onto S ′.
(e) (τ¯ |sjZ)◦ζ = ζ ′◦(δ¯|sjS).
Proof. Note SP Theorem 3.7 implies τ :T→T ′ and δ:C→C ′ are bijections.
(a). Take H ∈ H and c ∈ C. It is argued, in steps, that c ∈F¯ (H) by inspection
is equivalent to (∃t∈H) c ∈ F (t), which by SP Proposition 3.8(c) is equivalent to
(∃t∈H) δ(c) ∈ F ′(τ(t)), which by inspection is equivalent to (∃t∈T ) t ∈ H and
δ(c) ∈ F ′(τ(t)), which by the bijectivity of τ is equivalent to (∃t∈T ) τ(t) ∈ τ¯(H)
and δ(c) ∈ F ′(τ(t)), which by the bijectivity of τ is equivalent to (∃t′∈T ′) t′ ∈ τ¯(H)
and δ(c) ∈ F ′(t′), which by inspection is equivalent to (∃t′∈τ¯(H)) δ(c) ∈ F ′(t′),
which by inspection is equivalent to δ(c) ∈ F¯ ′◦τ¯(H).
(b). Take H ∈ H. (a) and the bijectivity of δ imply (∀c∈C) c ∈ F¯ (H) ⇔
c ∈ δ¯−1◦F¯ ′◦τ¯(H). Hence F¯ (H) = δ¯−1◦F¯ ′◦τ¯(H). Hence the bijectivity of δ im-
plies δ¯◦F¯ (H) = F¯ ′◦τ¯(H).
(c). As noted at the outset, δ is a bijection with domain C. Thus, since
F¯ (H) ⊆ C, it suffices to prove that δ¯◦F¯ (H) = F¯ ′◦τ¯(H). This is part (b).
(d). As noted at the outset, [1] δ:C→C ′ is a bijection. Thus, since S ⊆ P(C),
it suffices to show { δ¯(S) |S∈S } = S ′. It will be argued that
{ δ¯(S) |S∈S } = { δ¯(A) | A⊆C and (∀H∈H) |A∩F¯ (H)|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆C and (∀H∈H) |δ¯(A)∩δ¯◦F¯ (H)|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆C and (∀H∈H) |δ¯(A)∩F¯ ′(τ¯(H))|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆C and (∀H ′∈H′) |δ¯(A)∩F¯ ′(H ′)|=1 }
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= { A′⊆C ′ | (∀H ′∈H′) |A′∩F¯ ′(H ′)|=1 }
= S ′.
The first equality holds by the definition of S, the second by [1], the third by part
(b), the fourth by SP Theorem 3.8(e), the fifth by [1] (again), and the last by the
definition of S ′.
(e). This paragraph checks domains and codomains. S is both the domain of ζ
by definition, and the domain of δ¯|sjS by inspection. On the lefthand side only, Z is
both the codomain of ζ by definition, and the domain of τ¯ |sjZ by inspection. On the
righthand side only, S ′ is both the codomain of δ¯|sjS by part (d), and the domain of
ζ ′ by definition. Finally, Z ′ is both the codomain of τ¯ |sjZ by SP Proposition 2.7(h,i)
and SP Theorem 3.9, and the codomain of ζ ′ by definition.
Next take S ∈ S. This paragraph shows
(∀ t′ ∈ (τ¯ |sjZ)◦ζ(S)r{t′o}) q′(t′)∈ δ¯(S).
Toward that end, take [a] t′ ∈ (τ¯ |sjZ)◦ζ(S)r{t′o}. [a] implies there is [b] t ∈ ζ(S)
such that [c] τ(t) = t′. [a] and [c] imply [d] τ(t) 6= t′o. Since τ :T→T ′ is a bijection
(as noted at outset), and since τ(to) = t′o (by SP Proposition 2.7(c)), [d] implies
[e] t 6= to. [b] and [e] imply t ∈ ζ(S)r{to}, and thus the definition of ζ implies
q(t) ∈ S. Thus SP Proposition 3.8(d) implies q′(τ(t)) ∈ δ¯(S). Thus [c] implies
q′(t′) ∈ δ¯(S).
Finally, the definition of ζ ′ states that ζ ′◦(δ¯|sjS)(S) is the unique member of
{ Z ′∈Z ′ | (∀t′∈Z ′r{t′o}) q′(t′)∈δ¯(S) }.
The previous paragraph implies (τ¯ |sjZ)◦ζ(S) is a member of this collection. Thus
(τ¯ |sjZ)◦ζ(S) = ζ ′◦(δ¯|sjS)(S). 2
Appendix C. For NCF
Lemma C.1. Suppose Φ is an NCF form. Then (∀i∈I) (F¯ (H))H∈Hi is pairwise
disjoint and ∪H∈Hi F¯ (H) = Ci.
Proof. Take i ∈ I. SF Proposition 3.2(16b) implies that (F¯ (H))H∈H is pairwise
disjoint. This and Hi ⊆ H imply (F¯ (H))H∈Hi is pairwise disjoint. Thus it remains
to show ∪H∈Hi F¯ (H) = Ci.
For the forward direction, suppose c ∈ ∪H∈Hi F¯ (H). Then there is [a] H ∈ Hi
such that [b] c ∈ F¯ (H). [b] implies there is [c] t ∈ H such that [d] c ∈ F (t).
Meanwhile, [a] implies there is [e] c∗ ∈ Ci such that [f] H = FT(c∗). [f] and SF
Lemma A.1(b) imply [g] c∗ ∈ F¯ (H). [g], [c], and SP Proposition 3.2(16a) imply
c∗ ∈ F (t). This and [e] imply c∗ ∈ F (t)∩Ci. This, [F2], and [F3] imply F (t) ⊆ Ci.
This and [d] imply c ∈ Ci.
For the reverse direction, take c ∈ Ci. [P3] implies FT(c) 6= ∅. So c ∈ F¯◦FT(c).
Also note FT(c) ∈ Hi by the definition of Hi. Thus c ∈ ∪H∈Hi F¯ (H). 2
Proof C.2 (for Proposition 2.4). It suffices to show [A] that the function fol-
lowed by the purported inverse is the identity on S and [B] that the purported
inverse followed by the function is the identity on Πi∈ISi.
[A] Take S ∈ S. It will be argued that
S 7→ (S∩Ci)i∈I 7→ ∪i∈I(S∩Ci)i∈I = S ∩ ∪i∈ICi = S ∩ C = S.
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By inspection, the first arrow applies the function itself. To show that the second ar-
row applies the purported inverse, it suffices to show (S∩Ci)i∈I ∈ Πi∈ISi. For this
it suffices to show (∀i∈I) S∩Ci ∈ Si. Toward that end, take i ∈ I. By the definition
of Si, it must be shown that [a] S∩Ci ⊆ Ci and [b] (∀H∈Hi) |(S∩Ci)∩F¯ (H)|=1.
[a] is immediate. For [b], take H ∈ Hi. By Lemma C.1, F¯ (H) ⊆ Ci. Thus
(S∩Ci)∩F¯ (H) equals S∩F¯ (H), which is a singleton because S ∈ S. In the main
argument, the first two equalities holds by manipulation, and the final equality
holds because S ∈ S implies S ⊆ C.
[B] Take (Si)i∈I ∈ Πi∈ISi. Note that [1] (∀k∈I) Sk ∈ Sk, and that this implies
[2] (∀k∈I) Sk ⊆ Ck. It will be argued that
(Si)i∈I 7→ ∪i∈ISi 7→ ((∪i∈ISi)∩Cj)j∈I = (Sj∩Cj)j∈I = (Sj)j∈I .
By inspection, the first arrow applies the purported inverse. To show that the sec-
ond arrow applies the function itself, it suffices to show ∪i∈ISi ∈ S. By the defini-
tion of S, it suffices to show [a] ∪i∈ISi ⊆ C and [b] (∀H∈H) |(∪i∈ISi)∩F¯ (H)| = 1.
For [a], it suffices to show (∀k∈I) Sk ⊆ C. This follows from [2]. For [b], take
H ∈ H. SF Proposition 2.1(c) implies there is j ∈ I such that H ∈ Hj . Thus
Lemma C.1 implies F¯ (H) ⊆ Cj , which by [F2] implies (∀i∈Ir{j}) F¯ (H)∩Ci =
∅, which by [2] implies (∀i∈Ir{j}) F¯ (H)∩Si = ∅, which by inspection implies
(∪i∈ISi)∩F¯ (H) = Sj∩F¯ (H). The righthand side is a singleton by [1] and the
definition of Sj . Thus the lefthand side is a singleton. Thus [b] holds. To
see the first equality in the main argument, take j ∈ I. [2] implies (∀i∈Ir{j})
Si ⊆ Ci, which by [F2] implies (∀i∈Ir{j}) Si∩Cj = ∅, which by inspection im-
plies (∪i∈ISi)∩Cj = Sj∩Cj . To see the second equality in the main argument,
again take j ∈ I. [2] implies Sj ⊆ Cj , which implies Sj∩Cj = Sj . 2
Lemma C.3. Suppose Φ and Φ′ are NCF forms. Then the following are equiv-
alent.
(a) [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a subform inclusion.
(b) [Π,Π ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ ] is a subpreform inclusion, I ⊆ I ′, and (∀i∈I)Ci⊆C ′i.
(c) I ⊆ I ′, T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, (∀i∈I)Ci⊆C ′i, ⊗ = ⊗′|sjF gr , and H⊆H′.
Proof. (a)⇒(b). Suppose (a). Then, by definition, [1] [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ ,
incC,C′ ] is an inclusion, [2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, and [3] H ⊆ H′. [1] and the
“forgetful” functor of SF Theorem 2.7 imply [Π,Π ′, incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is an inclusion,
and thus [2]–[3] imply it is a subpreform inclusion. Also, [1] implies I ⊆ I ′. In light
of the last two sentences, it remains to show (∀i∈I) Ci ⊆ C ′i. This follows from [f3]
for [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ].
(b)⇒(c). Suppose (b). Then (c) follows from Lemma B.2(a)⇒(c).
(a)⇐(c). Suppose (c). Then [1] I ⊆ I ′, [2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, [3] (∀i∈I)Ci⊆C ′i,
[4] ⊗ = ⊗′|sjF gr , and [5] H⊆H′. [2] implies [6] T ⊆ T ′. [3] implies [7] C ⊆ C ′.
By the definition of a subform inclusion, it suffices to show that [i] I ⊆ I ′, that [ii]
T ⊆ T ′, that [iii] C ⊆ C ′, and that [iv] [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a morphism
satisfying T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′} and H⊆H′. By inspection, [i] is implied by [1], [ii] is
implied by [6], [iii] is implied by [7], and the two conditions in [iv] are implied by [2]
and [5]. Thus it remains to show that the quintuple [Π,Π ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ]
is a morphism. It will be argued that the quintuple satisfies [f1]–[f3]. For [f1], note
[1], [6], and [7] imply that incI,I′ :I→I ′, incT,T ′ :T→T ′, and incC,C′ :C→C ′ are well-
defined. For [f2], it suffices to show that ⊗gr ⊆ ⊗′ gr. This holds by [4]. Finally, [f3]
is implied by [3].
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Lemma C.4. Suppose [Φ,Φ′, τ, δ, ι] is an NCF isomorphism. Then (∀i∈I) δ¯|sjSi
is a bijection from Si onto S ′ι(i).
Proof. Take i ∈ I. SF Proposition 2.6(d) implies [1] δ|sjCi is a bijection from Ci
onto C ′ι(i). Thus, since Si ⊆ P(Ci), it suffices to show that
{ δ¯(Si) |Si∈Si } = { δ¯(A) | A⊆Ci and (∀H∈Hi) |A∩F¯ (H)|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆Ci and (∀H∈Hi) |δ¯(A)∩δ¯◦F¯ (H)|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆Ci and (∀H∈Hi) |δ¯(A)∩F¯ ′(τ¯(H))|=1 }
= { δ¯(A) | A⊆Ci and (∀H ′∈H′ι(i)) |δ¯(A)∩F¯ ′(H ′)|=1 }
= { A′⊆C ′ι(i) | (∀H ′∈H′ι(i)) |A′∩F¯ ′(H ′)|=1 }
= S ′ι(i).
The first equality holds by the definition of Si, the second by [1], the third by
Lemma B.3(b), the fourth by SF Proposition 2.6(m), the fifth by [1] (again), and
the last by the definition of S ′ι(i). 2
Appendix D. For NCG
D.1. Basics
Lemma D.1. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] and γ′ = [Γ ′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′] are
morphisms, with their θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and θ′ = [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′]. Then
the following hold.
(a) Take i ∈ I. Then U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) = U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′) implies β′ι(i)∗βi = β′ι(i)◦βi.
(b) Z ′ θ′ = Z ′ implies (∀i∈I) β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ) = β′ι(i)◦βi.
Proof. (a). Assume [1] U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) = U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′). By the definition of β′ι(i)∗βi, it
suffices to show that [i] the domain of β′ι(i)∗βi is equal to the domain of βi, [ii] the
codomain of βi is equal to the domain of β
′
ι(i), and [iii] the codomain of β
′
ι(i)∗βi is
equal to the codomain of β′ι(i).
For [i], the domain of β′ι(i)∗βi by definition is equal to βTi ◦U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
), which by
assumption [1] is equal to βTi ◦U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′). This is equal to the domain of βi because
the codomain of βi is U¯
′
ι(i)(Z ′) by [g2].
For [ii], the codomain of βi by [g2] is equal to U
′
ι(i)(Z ′), which by assumption [1]
is equal to U ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
), which by [g2] for γ′ is equal to the domain of β′ι(i).
For [iii], the codomain of β′ι(i)∗βi by definition is equal to U ′′ι′◦ι(i)(Z ′′), which by
[g2] for γ′ is equal to the codomain of β′ι(i).
(b). Assume [2] Z ′ θ′ = Z ′. Then take i ∈ I. [2] implies U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) = U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′).
Thus part (a) implies β′ι(i)∗βi = β′ι(i)◦βi. Thus it suffices to show that U¯i(Zθ
′◦θ)
equals the domain of βi. Note that [2] and Lemma A.11(b) imply Zθ′◦θ = Zθ.
Thus U¯i(Zθ′◦θ) equals U¯i(Zθ), which by [g2] equals the domain of βi. 2
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Lemma D.2. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] and γ′ = [Γ ′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′] are
morphisms. Then γ′◦γ is a morphism.
Proof. Let θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and θ′ = [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′].
Claim 1: (∀i∈I, Z∈Zθ′◦θ) βi(Ui(Z)) ∈ U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
). Take i ∈I and [a]Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ.
[a] and Lemma A.11(a) imply Z ∈ Zθ. Thus [g4] for γ implies [b] βi(Ui(Z)) =
U ′ι(i)(P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)). Also, [a] and Lemma A.11(c) imply P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′ θ′ .
Thus U ′ι(i)(P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)) ∈ U ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
). This and [b] imply the result.
Claim 2: (∀i∈I, Z∈Zθ′◦θ) β′ι(i)(βi(Ui(Z))) = U ′′ι′◦ι(i)(P ′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)).
Take i ∈ I and [a] Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ. [a] and Lemma A.11(a) imply Z ∈ Zθ. Thus [g4]
for γ implies [b] βi(Ui(Z)) = U
′
ι(i)(P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)). Also, [a] and Lemma A.11(c)
imply [c] P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ∈ Z ′ θ′ . It will be argued that
β′ι(i)(βi(Ui( Z )))
= β′ι(i)(U
′
ι(i)( P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z) ))
= U ′′ι′◦ι(i)( P
′′◦τ ′(t′o) ∪ τ¯ ′(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)) )
= U ′′ι′◦ι(i)( P
′′◦τ ′◦τ(to) ∪ τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z) ).
The first equality follows from [b], Claim 1, and the fact that the domain of β′ι(i)
is U ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
) by [g2] for γ′ at i′ = ι(i). The second equality follows from [c] and
[g4] for γ′ at i′ = ι(i) and Z ′ = P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z). The third equality follows from
Lemma A.10.
Conclusion. By the definition of a game morphism, it suffices to show that γ′◦γ
= [Γ, Γ ′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ, (β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ))i∈I ] satisfies the following:
[˚g1] [Φ,Φ′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ] is an NCF morphism,
[˚g2] (∀i∈I) β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ) : U¯i(Zθ
′◦θ)→ U¯ ′′ι′◦ι(i)(Z ′′),
[˚g3] (∀i∈I) β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ) is weakly increasing, and
[˚g4] (∀i∈I, Z∈Zθ′◦θ) β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ)(Ui(Z)) = U ′′ι′◦ι(i)(P ′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)).
[˚g1]. By [g1] for γ, [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism. Similarly, by [g1] for
γ′, [Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′] is an NCF morphism. Thus [Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′]◦[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] =
[Φ,Φ′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ] is an NCF morphism.
[˚g2]. Take i ∈ I. By the definition of β′ι(i)∗βi, it suffices to show that U¯i(Zθ
′◦θ)
is included in the domain of β′ι(i)∗βi, which is βTi ◦U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
). Toward that end,
take ui ∈ U¯i(Zθ′◦θ). Then there is [a] Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ such that [b] Ui(Z) = ui. [a] and
Claim 1 imply βi(Ui(Z)) ∈ U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
). Thus Ui(Z) ∈ βTi ◦U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
). This and [b]
imply ui ∈ βTi ◦U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′ θ
′
).
[˚g3]. This follows from the definition of (βι(i)∗βi)i∈I , from [g3] for γ, and from
[g3] for γ′.
[˚g4]. Take i ∈ I and Z ∈ Zθ′◦θ. In steps, β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ)(Ui(Z)) by the defini-
tion of β′ι(i)∗βi is equal to β′ι(i)(βi(Ui(Z))), which by Claim 2 is equal to
U ′′ι′◦ι(i)(P
′′◦τ ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯ ′◦τ¯(Z)). 2
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Proof D.3 (for Theorem 3.1).
Claim 1: If Γ is a game, idΓ is a morphism. Take Γ . It must be shown that
the sextuple [Γ, Γ, idI , idT , idC , (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ] satisfies [g1]–[g4]. For [g1], note that
[Φ,Φ, idI , idT , idC ] is an NCF identity, and thus a fortiori it is an NCF morphism.
Further, Z = Zθ by Proposition 2.3(b) and the fact that θ = [(T, p), (T, p), idT ] is a
subtree inclusion. Thus (idU¯i(Z))i∈I satisfies [g2]–[g3] by inspection. For [g4], take
i ∈ I and Z ∈ Z (this suffices since Zθ ⊆ Z, or alternatively, since Zθ = Z has
been shown). In steps, βi◦Ui(Z) by βi = idU¯i(Z) is equal to Ui(Z), which by Γ = Γ ′
and ι = idI is equal to U
′
ι(i)(Z), which by Lemma A.1(j) is equal to U
′
ι(i)(P
′(t′o)∪Z),
which by Γ = Γ ′ and τ = idT is equal to U ′ι(i)(P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)).
Conclusion. Claim 1 has established the well-definition of identity, and Lemma
D.2 has established the well-definition of composition. The unit and associative
laws are straightforward. Thus NCG is a category. 2
Proof D.4 (for Theorem 3.2). By [G1], F0 maps any game into a form. By [g1],
F1 maps any game morphism into a form morphism. Thus is suffices to show that F
preserves source, target, identity, and composition (Mac Lane 1998, page 13). This
is done in the following four claims.
Claim 1: F1([Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β])src = F0([Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]src). In steps,
F1([Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β])src by the definition of F1 is equal to [F0(Γ ),F0(Γ ′), ι, τ, δ]src which
by the definition of src in NCF is equal to F0(Γ ), which by the definition of src in
NCG is equal to F0([Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β]src).
Claim 2: F1([Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β])trg = F0([Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]trg). This is very similar to
Claim 1. Simply change src to trg.
Claim 3: F1(idΓ ) = idF0(Γ ). In steps, F1(idΓ ) by the definition of id in NCG is
equal to F1([Γ, Γ, idI , idT , idC , (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ]), which by the definition of F1 is equal to
[F0(Γ ),F0(Γ ), idI , idT , idC ], which by the definition of id in NCF is equal to idF0(Γ ).
Claim 4: F1([Γ
′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′]◦[Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]) = F1([Γ ′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′]) ◦
F1([Γ, Γ
′, ι, τ, δ,β]). It will be argued that
F1([Γ
′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′]◦[Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β])
= F1([Γ, Γ
′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ, (β′ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ′◦θ))i∈I ])
= [F0(Γ ),F0(Γ
′′), ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ]
= [F0(Γ
′),F0(Γ ′′), ι′, τ ′, δ′] ◦ [F0(Γ ),F0(Γ ′), ι, τ, δ]
= F1([Γ
′, Γ ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′,β′]) ◦ F1([Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β]),
where θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] and θ′ = [(T ′, p′), (T ′′, p′′), τ ′]. The first equality holds
by the definition of ◦ in NCG, the second by the definition of F1, the third by the
definition of ◦ in NCF, and the fourth by two applications of the definition of F1.
2
40 D. For NCG
D.2. Subgames
Lemma D.5. Suppose Γ and Γ ′ are NCG games. Then the following are
equivalent.
(a) [Γ, Γ ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ , (incU¯i(Z),U¯ ′i(Z′))i∈I ] is a subgame inclusion.
(b) [b1] [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is a subform inclusion and
[b2] (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) Ui(Z) = U ′i(P ′(to)∪Z).
(c) [c1] I ⊆ I ′, [c2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, [c3] (∀i∈I)Ci⊆C ′i, [c4] ⊗=⊗′|sjF gr ,
[c5] H⊆H′, and [c6] (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) Ui(Z) = U ′i(P ′(to)∪Z).
Proof. (a)⇒(b). Suppose (a). Then, by definition, [1] γ = [Γ, Γ ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ ,
incC,C′ , (incU¯i(Z),U¯ ′i(Z′))i∈I ] is an inclusion, [2] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, and [3] H′ ⊆ H.
[1] and the “forgetful” functor of Theorem 3.2 imply [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ]
is a form inclusion, and thus [2] and [3] imply it is a subform inclusion. Hence
[b1] holds. Further, [b1], Lemma C.3(a⇒b), and Lemma B.2(a⇒b) imply θ =
[(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a subtree inclusion. Hence Proposition 2.3(b) implies [4] Zθ =
Z. Also, [1] implies γ is a morphism. Thus [g4] and [4] imply (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) Ui(Z) =
U ′i(P
′(to)∪Z). Thus [b2] holds.
(a)⇐(b). Suppose (b). [b1], Lemma C.3(a⇒b), and Lemma B.2(a⇒b) imply
θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a subtree inclusion. Hence Proposition 2.3(b) implies
[1] Zθ = Z. Further, by definition, [b1] implies [2] [Φ,Φ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ ] is
an inclusion, [3] T = {t′∈T ′|to4′t′}, and [4] H′ ⊆ H. Now consider the sextuple
γ = [Γ, Γ ′, incI,I′ , incT,T ′ , incC,C′ , (incU¯i(Z),U¯ ′i(Z′))i∈I ]. By [2], γ satisfies [g1]. By
inspection and [1], γ satisfies [g2]–[g3]. By [b2] and [1], γ satisfies [g4]. Thus γ is a
morphism. Thus by inspection and [1], γ is a game inclusion. Thus by [3] and [4],
γ is a subgame inclusion.
(b)⇔(c). [b1] is equivalent to [c1]–[c5] by Lemma C.3(a⇔c). [b2] and [c6] are
identical. 2
D.3. Isomorphisms
Lemma D.6. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ,β] is an isomorphism. Then the follow-
ing hold.
(a) Each member of {ι, τ, δ}∪{βi|i∈I} is a bijection.
(b) γ−1 = [Γ ′, Γ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1, (β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ].
Proof. Since γ is an isomorphism, there are ι#, τ#, δ#, and β# such that
γ−1 = [Γ ′, Γ, ι#, τ#, δ#,β#].
Let θ# = [(T ′, p′), (T, p), τ#].
Claim 1: (a) ι is a bijection, (b) ι# = ι−1, (c) τ is a bijection, (d) τ# = τ−1,
(e) δ is a bijection, and (f) δ# = δ−1. Since γ and γ−1 are an inverse pair, the
“forgetful” functor of Theorem 3.2 implies that [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] and [Φ′, Φ, ι#, τ#, δ#]
are an inverse pair. Thus the claim follows from SF Theorem 2.4.
Claim 2: (a) θ is an isomorphism and (b) θ# = θ−1. (a) follows from the
definition of θ, Claim 1(c), and the second sentence of SP Theorem 2.6. For (b), in
steps, θ−1 by the third sentence of SP Theorem 2.6 is equal to [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ−1],
which by Claim 1(d) is equal to [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ#], which by definition equals θ#.
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Claim 3: (a) Zθ = Z. (b) Z ′ θ−1 = Z ′. (c) Z ′ θ# = Z ′. Claim 2(a) implies
θ and θ−1 are isomorphisms. Thus (a) follows from Proposition 2.3(c)[1], and (b)
follows from the same proposition with its θ set equal to θ−1. (c) follows from (b)
and Claim 2(b).
Claim 4: (∀i∈I) β#ι(i)◦βi = idU¯i(Z). Take i ∈ I. Since γ and γ−1 are an inverse
pair, γ−1◦γ = idΓ . Thus the definitions of composition and identity imply
[i] β#ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ#◦θ) = idU¯i(Z).
Meanwhile, consider Lemma D.1(b) with its γ′ equal to γ−1. This and Claim 3(c)
imply
[ii] β#ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Zθ#◦θ) = β
#
ι(i)◦βi.
The claim follows from [i] and [ii].
Claim 5: (∀i′∈I ′) βι#(i′)◦β#i′ = idU¯ ′
i′ (Z′). Take i
′ ∈ I ′. Since γ and γ−1 are an
inverse pair, γ◦γ−1 = idΓ ′ . Thus the definitions of composition and identity imply
[i] βι#(i′)∗β#i′ |U¯ ′
i′ (Z′ θ◦θ
#
)
= idU¯ ′
i′ (Z′).
Meanwhile, consider Lemma D.1(b), with its γ equal to γ−1 here, and its γ′ equal
to γ here. This and Claim 3(a) imply
[ii] βι#(i′)∗β#i′ |U¯ ′
i′ (Z′ θ◦θ
#
)
= βι#(i′)◦β#i′ .
The claim follows from [i] and [ii].
Claim 6: (∀i∈I) βi is a bijection, and β#ι(i) = β−1i . Take i ∈ I. Claim 4 implies
[a] β#ι(i)◦βi = idU¯i(Z). Meanwhile, Claim 5 at i′ = ι(i) implies βι#◦ι(i)◦β#ι(i) =
idU¯ ′
ι(i)
(Z′). Thus Claim 1(b) implies βι−1◦ι(i)◦β#ι(i) = idU¯ ′ι(i)(Z′). Thus [b] βi◦β
#
ι(i) =
idU¯ ′
ι(i)
(Z′). The claim follows from [a] and [b].
Claim 7: (β#i′ )i′∈I′ = (β
−1
ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ . Claim 6 implies (β
#
ι(i))i∈I = (β
−1
i )i∈I . Thus
the result follows from Claim 1(a).
Conclusion. Part (a) follows from Claims 1(a,c,e) and 6. Part (b) follows from
Claims 1(b,d,f) and 7. 2
Lemma D.7. Suppose γ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (βi)i∈I ] is a morphism. Also suppose
that each member of {ι, τ, δ}∪{βi|i∈I} is a bijection. Then γ is an isomorphism.
Proof. Let θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ]. Further, let
γ¨ = [Γ ′, Γ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1, (β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ]
and let θ¨ = [(T ′, p′), (T, p), τ−1].
Claim 1: (a) θ is an isomorphism, and (b) θ¨ = θ−1. (a) follows from the defini-
tion of θ, the bijectivity of τ , and second sentence of SP Theorem 2.6. For (b), in
steps, θ¨ by definition equals [(T ′, p′), (T, p), τ−1] which by the third sentence of SP
Theorem 2.6 equals θ−1.
Claim 2: (a) Zθ = Z, (b) Z ′ θ−1 = Z ′, and (c) Z ′ θ¨ = Z ′. Claim 1(a) implies
θ and θ−1 are isomorphisms. Thus (a) follows from Proposition 2.3(c)[1], and (b)
follows from the same proposition with its θ set equal to θ−1. (c) follows from (b)
and Claim 1(b).
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Claim 3: (a) P ′◦τ(to) = ∅, and (b) P◦τ−1(t′o) = ∅. Claim 1(a) implies θ and
θ−1 are isomorphisms. Thus (a) follows from Proposition 2.3(c)[2], and (b) follows
from the same proposition with its θ set equal to θ−1.
Claim 4: (∀i∈I) βi : U¯i(Z)→ U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′) is a bijection. Take i ∈ I. [g2] for γ im-
plies βi : U¯i(Zθ)→U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′). Thus Claim 2(a) implies βi : U¯i(Z)→U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′). βi is a
bijection by assumption.
Claim 5: γ¨ is a morphism. It suffices to show
[g¨1] [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1] is an NCF morphism,
[g¨2] (∀i′∈I ′) β−1ι−1(i′) : U¯ ′i′(Z ′ θ¨) → U¯ι−1(i′)(Z),
[g¨3] (∀i′∈I ′) β−1ι−1(i′) is weakly increasing, and
[g¨4] (∀i′∈I ′, Z ′∈Z ′ θ¨) β−1ι−1(i′)(U ′i′(Z ′)) = Uι−1(i′)(P◦τ¯−1(t′o)∪τ¯−1(Z ′)).
For [g¨1], note that SF Theorem 2.4(b), and the bijectivity of ι, τ , and δ, imply
that [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1] is an NCF isomorphism. Thus, a fortiori, [g¨1] holds.
For [g¨2], take i′ ∈ I ′. [g2] for γ at i = ι−1(i′) implies that βι−1(i′) : U¯ι−1(i′)(Zθ)
→ U¯ ′ι◦ι−1(i′)(Z ′). Thus, by applying Claim 2(a) to the domain, and by simplifying
the codomain, βι−1(i′) : U¯ι−1(i′)(Z) → U¯ ′i′(Z ′). Thus bijectivity implies β−1ι−1(i′) :
U¯ ′i′(Z ′) → U¯ι−1(i′)(Z). This and Claim 2(c) imply [g¨2].
For [g¨3], take i′ ∈ I ′. By [g3] for γ at i = ι−1(i′), βι−1(i′) is weakly increasing.
Thus, since this function is bijective by assumption, it is strictly increasing. Thus
its inverse β−1ι−1(i′) is also strictly increasing.
For [g¨4], consider the following statements.
[1] (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) U ′ι(i)(τ¯(Z)) = βi(Ui(Z)).
[2] (∀i∈I, Z∈Z) β−1i (U ′ι(i)(τ¯(Z))) = Ui(Z).
[3] (∀i∈I, Z ′∈Z ′) β−1i (U ′ι(i)(Z ′)) = Ui(τ¯−1(Z ′)).
[4] (∀i′∈I ′, Z ′∈Z ′) β−1ι−1(i′)(U ′i′(Z ′)) = Uι−1(i′)(τ¯−1(Z ′)).
[g4] for γ is equivalent to [1] because of Claims 2(a) and 3(a). [1]⇔[2] because of
Claim 4. [2]⇔[3] because of Claim 1(a) and Proposition 2.1. [3]⇔[4] because ι is
bijective. Finally, [4] is equivalent to [g¨4] because of Claims 2(c) and 3(b).
Claim 6: (∀i∈I) β−1ι−1◦ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Z θ¨◦θ) = β−1ι−1◦ι(i)◦βi. Consider Lemma D.1(b)
with its (γ, θ) equal to (γ, θ), and its (γ′, θ′) equal to (γ¨, θ¨). Lemma D.1’s first
sentence holds by assumption and Claim 5. Lemma D.1(b)’s condition Z ′ θ′ = Z ′
becomes Z ′ θ¨ = Z ′, which holds by Claim 2(c). Thus the lemma implies the result.
Claim 7: (∀i′∈I ′) βι−1(i′)∗β−1ι−1(i′)|U¯ ′
i′ (Z′ θ◦θ¨)
= βι−1(i′)◦β−1ι−1(i′). Consider Lemma
D.1(b) with its (γ, θ) equal to (γ¨, θ¨), and its (γ′, θ′) equal to (γ, θ). Lemma D.1’s first
sentence holds by assumption and Claim 5. Lemma D.1(b)’s condition Z ′ θ
′
= Z ′
becomes Zθ = Z, which holds by Claim 2(a). Thus the lemma implies the result.
Claim 8: γ¨◦γ = idΓ . It is argued that
γ¨◦γ = [Γ ′, Γ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1, (β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ]◦[Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (βi)i∈I ]
= [Γ, Γ, ι−1◦ι, τ−1◦τ, δ−1◦δ, (β−1ι−1◦ι(i)∗βi|U¯i(Z θ¨◦θ))i∈I ]
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= [Γ, Γ, ι−1◦ι, τ−1◦τ, δ−1◦δ, (β−1ι−1◦ι(i)◦βi)i∈I ]
= [Γ, Γ, ι−1◦ι, τ−1◦τ, δ−1◦δ, (β−1i ◦βi)i∈I ]
= [Γ, Γ, idI , idT , idC , (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ]
= idΓ ,
In the righthand side of the second equality, ι(i) appears due to the definition of
composition. The third equality holds by Claim 6. The last component of the fifth
equality holds by Claim 4. The remainder is immediate.
Claim 9: γ◦γ¨ = idΓ ′ . It is argued that
γ◦γ¨ = [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (βi)i∈I ]◦[Γ ′, Γ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1, (β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ]
= [Γ ′, Γ ′, ι◦ι−1, τ◦τ−1, δ◦δ−1, (βι−1(i′)∗β−1ι−1(i′)|U¯i′ (Z′ θ◦θ¨))i′∈I′ ]
= [Γ ′, Γ ′, ι◦ι−1, τ◦τ−1, δ◦δ−1, (βι−1(i′)◦β−1ι−1(i′))i′∈I′ ]
= [Γ ′, Γ ′, idI′ , idT ′ , idC′ , (idU¯ ′
ι◦ι−1(i′)(Z′)
)i′∈I′ ]
= [Γ ′, Γ ′, idI′ , idT ′ , idC′ , (idU¯ ′
i′ (Z′))i′∈I′ ]
= idΓ ′ .
In the righthand side of the second equality, β carries the subscript ι−1(i′) because
of the definition of composition. The third equality holds by Claim 7. The last
component of the fourth equality holds by Claim 4 at i = ι−1(i′). The remainder
is immediate.
Conclusion. Claims 5, 8, and 9 imply that γ and γ¨ are an inverse pair. Thus γ
is an isomorphism. 2
Proof D.8 (for Theorem 3.4). The forward direction of (a) and all of (b) hold
by Lemma D.6. The reverse direction of (a) holds by Lemma D.7. 2
Proof D.9 (for Proposition 3.6). Figure 3.1’s functors imply that [1] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]
is a form isomorphism, [2] [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform isomorphism, and [3] θ =
[(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a tree isomorphism.
(a) follows from [3] and Proposition 2.1. (b) follows from [3] and Proposi-
tion 2.3(c). (c) follows from [2] and Lemma B.3(c). (d) follows from [1] and
Lemma C.4. (e) follows from [2] and Lemma B.3(d). (f) follows from [2] and
Lemma B.3(e).
(g). Take i ∈ I. Theorem 3.4(a) implies that βi is a bijection from U¯i(Zθ) onto
U¯i(Z). Part (b)[1] implies Zθ = Z. Finally, [g3] and bijectivity imply βi is strictly
increasing.
(h). Take i ∈ I. [g4] and both halves of part (b) imply (∀Z∈Z) βi(Ui(Z)) =
U ′ι(i)(τ¯(Z)). Thus it remains to check domains and codomains. Z is both the
domain of Ui by [G2], and the domain of τ¯ |sjZ by inspection. On the lefthand side
only, U¯i(Z) is both the codomain of Ui by [G2], and the domain of βi by part (g).
On the righthand side only, Z ′ is both the codomain of τ¯ |sjZ by part (a), and the
domain of U ′ι(i) by [G2] for Γ
′ at i′ = ι(i). Finally, U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′) is both the codomain
of βi by [g2], and the codomain of U¯
′
ι(i′) by [G2] for Γ
′ at i′ = ι(i). 2
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D.4. Nash-equilibria
Proof D.10 (for Proposition 3.7). Note Theorem 3.4(a) implies [a] ι:I→I ′ is
a bijection and [b] δ:C→C ′ is a bijection. Also, SF Proposition 2.6(d) and the
“forgetful” functor of Theorem 3.2 imply that [c] (∀i∈I) δi:Ci→C ′ι(i) is a bijection.
Take S ⊆ S, and consider the following.
[1] (∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) Ui◦ζ(S) ≥ Ui◦ζ( (SrCi)∪S+i ).
[2] (∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) βi◦Ui◦ζ(S) ≥ βi◦Ui◦ζ( (SrCi)∪S+i ).
[3] (∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) U ′ι(i)◦τ¯ |sjZ◦ζ(S) ≥ U ′ι(i)◦τ¯ |sjZ◦ζ( (SrCi)∪S+i ).
[4] (∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( δ¯(S) ) ≥ U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( δ¯((SrCi)∪S+i ) ).
[5] (∀i∈I, S+i ∈Si) U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( δ¯(S) ) ≥ U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( (δ¯(S)rC ′ι(i))∪δ¯(S+i ) ).
[6] (∀i∈I, S′+ι(i)∈Sι(i)) U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( δ¯(S) ) ≥ U ′ι(i)◦ζ ′( (δ¯(S)rC ′ι(i))∪S′+ι(i) ).
[7] (∀i′∈I ′, S′+i′ ∈Si′) U ′i′◦ζ ′( δ¯(S) ) ≥ U ′i′◦ζ ′( (δ¯(S)rC ′i′)∪S′+i′ ).
S being a Nash-equilibrium in Γ is equivalent to [1], by definition. [1]⇔[2] by
Proposition 3.6(g). [2]⇔[3] by Proposition 3.6(h). [3]⇔[4] by Proposition 3.6(f).
[4]⇔[5] by [b] and [c]. [5]⇔[6] by Proposition 3.6(d). [6]⇔[7] by [a]. Finally, [7] is
equivalent to δ¯(S) being a Nash-equilibrium in Γ ′, by definition. 2
D.5. Subcategories
Lemma D.11. Suppose Γ is an NCG game (with NCF form Φ). Further
suppose Φ′ is an NCF form and [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism. Then (a)
ι:I→I ′ and τ¯ |sjZ :Z→Z ′ are bijections. Further, define
Γ ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′∈I′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′, (Uι−1(i′)◦(τ¯ |sjZ)−1)i′∈I′).
Then (b) Γ ′ is an NCG game and (c) [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ] is an NCG iso-
morphism.
Proof. Let θ = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ].
Claim 1: (a) τ¯ |sjZ :Z→Z ′ is a bijection, (b) Zθ = Z, and (c) P ′◦τ(to) = ∅. θ
is a tree isomorphism because of [i] the assumption that [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF
isomorphism and [ii] the “forgetful” functors of Figure 3.1. Thus (a) follows from
Proposition 2.1, and (b) and (c) follow from Proposition 2.3(c).
Claim 2: (a) ι:I→I ′ is a bijection, and (b) (∀i∈I) U ′ι(i)◦τ¯ |sjZ = Ui. (a) This
follows from SF Theorem 2.4(a) and the assumption that [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF
isomorphism. (b) The definition of Γ ′ implies (∀i′∈I ′) U ′i′ = Uι−1(i′)◦(τ¯ |sjZ)−1. Thus
Claim 1(a) implies (∀i′∈I ′) U ′i′◦τ¯ |sjZ = Uι−1(i′). This and part (a) imply part (b).
Claim 3: Γ ′ is an NCG game. [G1] for Γ ′ holds because Φ′ is an NCF form
by assumption. For [G2] take i′ ∈ I ′. Claim 2(a), and [G2] for Γ at i = ι−1(i′),
imply Uι−1(i′) is a surjective real-valued function from Z. Thus Claim 1(a) implies
Uι−1(i′)◦(τ¯ |sjZ)−1 is a surjective real-valued function from Z ′. Thus the definition of
Γ ′ implies U ′i′ is a surjective real-valued function from Z ′. This is [G2] for Γ ′ at i′.
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Claim 4: The sextuple [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ] is an NCG morphism. Γ is an
NCG game by assumption. Γ ′ is an NCG game by Claim 3. It remains to show
[g˜1] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism,
[g˜2] (∀i∈I) idU¯i(Z) : U¯i(Zθ)→ U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′),
[g˜3] (∀i∈I) idU¯i(Z) is weakly increasing, and
[g˜4] (∀i∈I, Z∈Zθ) idU¯i(Z)(Ui(Z)) = U¯ ′ι(i)(P ′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)).
[g˜1] is implied, a fortiori, by the assumption that [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomor-
phism. [g˜3] is obvious.
For [g˜2], it suffices to show that [i] the domain of idU¯i(Z), which is U¯i(Z), is
equal to U¯i(Zθ), and that [ii] the codomain of idU¯i(Z), which is U¯i(Z), is equal
to U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′). [i] follows from Claim 1(b). For [ii], in steps, U¯ ′ι(i)(Z ′) by definition
equals U¯i◦(τ¯ |sjZ)−1(Z ′), which by Claim 1(a) equals U¯i(Z).
For [g˜4], take i ∈ I and Z ∈ Zθ. Claim 1(b) [or Zθ ⊆ Z] implies Z ∈ Z, which
implies [1] Ui(Z) ∈ U¯i(Z). Then, in steps, idU¯i(Z)(Ui(Z)) by [1] is equal to Ui(Z),
which by Claim 2(b) is equal to U ′ι(i)(τ¯(Z)), which by Claim 1(c) is equal to
U ′ι(i)(P
′◦τ(to)∪τ¯(Z)).
Claim 5: [Γ, Γ ′, ι, τ, δ, (idU¯i(Z))i∈I ] is an NCG isomorphism. This follows from
Claim 4 and Corollary 3.5(a⇐c) because [i] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism
by assumption and [ii] each idU¯i(Z) is a bijection by inspection.
Conclusion. Part (a) follows from Claims 2(a) and 1(a). Part (b) follows from
Claim 3. Part (c) follows from Claim 5. 2
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